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From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstilbestrol: The
Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in Californiat
STEPHEN A. SPITz*
Among the most troublesome cases for courts in California and elsewhere
are those in which the plaintiff has suffered a major injury, wrongfully
caused, but the plaintiff cannot identify the tortfeasor responsible. If the
plaintiff can identify an injurer over the course of litigation all is well.' If
the plaintiff cannot significantly narrow the list of potential wrongdoers the
tort system is unable to provide a remedy. 2 Difficulty arises, however, when
the plaintiff can identify a group of possible tortfeasors, but cannot identify
any particular defendant as the one which actually caused his or her injury.
As a general principle of tort law, a plaintiff must establish a connection
between his or her injury and an act or omission of the defendant.3 Inherent
in this requirement is an identification of the defendant as the tortfeasor. 4
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in its ordinary sense,5 relieves a plaintiff
of the burden of proving the precise cause of injury but not of the necessity
of identifying the responsible tortfeasor.6 Thus, to permit recovery by
plaintiffs victimized by unidentifiable tortfeasors, doctrinal expansion has
been necessary. California courts have responded to the call.7
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1. In jurisdictions where fictitious name or "Doe" pleading is permitted, for example, a
plaintiff may establish the identity of tortfeasors subsequent to the filing of his complaint.
2. Cf. Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 V"D. L. REv. 1281 (1980) (advocating administrative system of compensation).
3. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENs, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. This connection is
usually labelled "proximate cause" or "legal cause." Id.
4. In a products liability case, for example, an essential element has been, until recently
at least, the identification of the named defendant as the manufacturer or supplier of the
defective product. See id. § 103, at 713.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 8-45.
6. This results from the control requirement, or the requirement of bringing negligence
home to the defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
7. Although the importance of the issues discussed herein is not limited to any particular
jurisdiction, I have confined the focus of this article to California cases. California courts
have generally been on the leading edge of developments in the law in this area and, by
focusing on a single jurisdiction, the progression of and interrelationships among the cases are
more easily discernible.
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In Part I of this article, I will discuss res ipsa loquitur as a rule of
circumstantial evidence and will proceed to trace its doctrinal progression
through a policy-driven version of the doctrine to the concerted action and
alternative liability theories of liability. In Part II, I will focus on the setting
in which the problem of unidentifiable tortfeasors has been most dramati-
cally presented-women injured by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). Finally,
in Part III, I will suggest considerations for courts fashioning new theories
of liability for unidentifiable tortfeasor cases or applying existing tort
theories to new factual situations.
I. THE DOCTRINAL PROGRESSION OF THE UNIDENTIFIABLE
TORTFEASOR
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur and Inferences from Circumstantial
Evidence
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as it appears in its usual and most
familiar form, is a rule of circumstantial evidence. 8 More precisely, it allows
(or compels) an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence where
the defendant is unable to present sufficient contrary evidence. The doctrine
applies "where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said ... that
it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant
is probably the person who is responsible." 9 It is worth noting that the
"inference of negligence" permitted by the doctrine is not an inference that
a particular act of the defendant was negligent, but is an inference that the
defendant did some negligent act which proximately caused the harm in
question although the specific cause of the plaintiff's injury is unknown. 0
8. William Prosser was a strong proponent of this view. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 213 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter W. PROSSER, TORTs]; Prosser, Res
Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 183, 191 (1949) [hereinafter Prosser, Res Ipsa];
cf. Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 409, 426 P.2d 525, 532, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 132 (1967)
(doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "fundamentally predicated upon inferences deducible from
circumstantial evidence and the weight to be given to them" (citing Quintal v. Laurel Grove
Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1964))).
9. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 446, 247 P.2d 344, 349 (1952); see
also Clark, 66 Cal. 2d at 409, 426 P.2d at 532, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 132; Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra
note 8, at 233. Under California Evidence Code § 646, enacted in 1970, res ipsa loquitur is a
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. Once the defendant has introduced
evidence that would support a finding that he was not negligent or that any negligence on his
part was not a proximate cause of the occurrence, the presumption vanishes. However, the
jury may still find the defendant negligent on the basis of the circumstantial evidence that
gave rise to the doctrine. See Law Revision Commission Comment of 1970, CAL. Evm. CODE
§ 646 (West Supp. 1989).
10. See Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d 681, 687, 394 P.2d 697, 700, 39 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884
(1964) ("There is no absolute requirement that the plaintiff explain how the accident happened.
Res ipsa loquitur may apply where the cause of the injury is a mystery, if there is a reasonable




It may appear that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as so stated, is no
more than an embodiment of common sense. Surely judges and juries are
capable of drawing conclusions from circumstantial evidence without the
aid of a doctrine with a latin name." However, the doctrine, by focusing
on the likelihood of the essential components of the plaintiff's case, provides
a logical framework for approaching circumstantial evidence. As such, it is
a powerful antidote to an unfortunate judicial hesitancy to accept circum-
stantial evidence. This hesitancy, and the utility of res ipsa loquitur in
combatting it, can be seen most clearly in a brief examination of the line
of cases following Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co.'2 and the com-
mentary those cases have inspired.
Upham Sargent was a young adventurer who disappeared kayaking down
the Nottaway River in Quebec. The Sargent case involved the effort of
Sargent's father (the beneficiary of Upham's accident insurance policy), to
collect a claim requiring that he prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the insured died from an accidental injury."' Although the Massachusetts
Supreme Court found this burden satisfied, it first made the following
observations with respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard:
It has been held not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat
favor a proposition to be proved; for example, the fact that colored
automobiles made in the current year outnumber black ones would not
warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of the current year is
colored and not black, nor would the fact that only a minority of men
die of cancer warrant a finding that a particular man did not die of
cancer.... The weight or ponderance of evidence is its power to
convince the tribunal which has the determination of the fact, of the
actual truth of the proposition to be proved. After the evidence has
been weighed, that proposition is proved by a ponderance of the evidence
11. See Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note 8, at 184-85; Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufraglo, 63 HARv. L. REv. 643, 645 (1950); cf. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, I
BunAio L. REv. 1, 1 (1951) (characterizing Prosser's and Seavey's position as being that "the
concept of res ipsa loquitur where it is correctly applied is redundant and where it is not
redundant is wrong").
12. 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). Praise of the doctrine because it helps plaintiffs
win cases and because it is used to revise concepts of liability and proof, see, e.g., Jaffe,
supra note 11, at 15, is, to my mind, unconvincing. An argument that the plaintiff should
prevail in a negligence action even though the evidence is not sufficient to show that the
plaintiff's injury was more probably than not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence
is really an argument that a different standard of care (e.g., strict liability) should be applied
to the defendant's conduct. Such a position is better established directly than by distortion of
the negligence standard. See Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 530, 203 P.2d
522, 532 (1949) (Traynor, J., dissenting and concurring) (If strict liability is to be imposed "it
should be imposed openly and not by spurious application of rules developed to determine
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in negligence cases."). The use of the doctrine to
pursue distinct policy goals is the subject of Part I, section B infra. Although the legal
standards resulting from the policy-driven application of the doctrine may be justified, the use
of the term "res ipsa loquitur" has created confusion and invited misapplication.
13. Sargent, 307 Mass. at 250, 29 N.E.2d at 827.
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if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual
belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds
of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there."
This language was quoted approvingly in two subsequent Massachusetts
Supreme Court decisions finding defendants not to have been sufficiently
identified as the cause of the plaintiff's injury. In Smith v. Rapid Transit,
Inc., 5 the plaintiff was forced off the street by a bus, but she offered no
evidence other than that the defendant had the sole franchise for operating
a bus line on that street. In Tartas' Case,16 the plaintiff sued the Workmen's
compensation insurer of one employer, but the court found that the plain-
tiff's decedent could have contracted his fatal illness while working for any
of several employers.'
7
The meaning of the Sargent court's "actual belief" dictum has stirred
considerable interest in academic circles. There are several possible expla-
nations. A first possibility is that the "actual belief" required by Sargent
exists only if the plaintiff shows that the likelihood of the proposition to
be proved exceeds fifty percent by some significant margin. This would, of
course, run counter to generally understood standards of proof in civil
litigation. In addition, contrary to what the Sargent court may have thought, 8
such a rule would in individual cases increase the likelihood of an erroneous
decision.' 9 Moreover, none of the Sargent cases have discussed the proof
requirement in numerical terms.
A more subtle interpretation is that Sargent requires a plaintiff to offer
some individualized proof; general statistical evidence, except perhaps in
14. Id.
15. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). The Smith case is the basis for the blue bus
hypothetical. See infra text accompanying note 276.
16. 328 Mass. 585, 105 N.E.2d 380 (1952).
17. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has continued to cite Sargent with approval. See,
e.g., Stepakoff v. Kantar, 393 Mass. 836, 473 N.E.2d 1131 (1985); King's Case, 352 Mass.
488, 225 N.E.2d 900 (1967); Sullivan v. Hamacher, 339 Mass. 190, 158 N.E.2d 301 (1959);
Sevigny's Case, 337 Mass. 747, 151 N.E.2d 258 (1958); Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33,
133 N.E.2d 489 (1956); see also Lampe v. Franklin Am. Trust Co., 339 Mo. 361, 384, 96
S.W.2d 710, 723 (1936) (The jury "must not attempt to base a verdict upon what facts may
be 'more probable,' if they cannot decide what facts are true.").
18. See Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil
Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79, 94 (1982) [hereinafter Brook, Inevitable Errors] ("the early
exponents of the actual-belief-in-truth concept regarded it as actually a way of increasing
accuracy and limiting the number of errors").
19. See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAMD.
L. REv. 807, 822-23 (1961); Brook, Inevitable Errors, supra note 18, at 86; Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1341 n.37
(1971); cf. Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1481
(1979) (arguing that plaintiffs who attempt to prove negligence indirectly should generally be
required to show that the likelihood of negligence is substantially greater than not); Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System,
97 HARv. L. REv. 851, 875 n.101 (1984) (suggesting that, by reducing the number of cases,
overdeterrence of tortious conduct may minimize errors).
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rare instances, is not enough to satisfy the plaintiff's burden? ° This position
is defended either by asserting that particularistic evidence is necessary to
provide a causal explanation, 2' or by arguing that in most cases, taking into
account the probative value of the nonproduction of particularistic evidence,
the likelihood of the required showing is less than 50% even though the
statistical evidence taken alone may suggest that the likelihood is greater. 22
The counterargument is that, in terms of its value in deciding cases,
particularistic evidence is not qualitatively different, much less better, than
statistical evidence.23 Moreover, even taking into account the lack of par-
ticularistic evidence, the plaintiff's statistical evidence may be strong enough
to make the probability of the truth of his assertion greater than 50%.2
Although it is certainly relevant if a party that should be able to produce
evidence does not produce it,25 the pursuit of certain kinds of evidence (i.e.,
nonstatistical evidence, or even noncircumstantial evidence) may interfere
with proper factfinding.
A third explanation of the Sargent cases looks beyond the language of
the courts to the factual records underlying the cases before them. Read
narrowly, the Sargent cases stand for the simple proposition that a plaintiff
may not recover if he or she offers no evidence on a crucial part of his or
her case. 26 Although cases are best decided by examining the whole of the
20. See Brook, Inevitable Errors, supra note 18, at 89; see, e.g., Tribe, supra note 19, at
1341 n.37; Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALrF. L. REv. 1735, 1826 (1985); see also
Jaffe, supra note 11, at 4 (characterizing traditional view as being that "[t]he conditions for
a finding are not satisfied merely by showing a greater statistical probability.... There must
be a rational, i.e., evidentiary, basis on which the jury can choose the competing probabili-
ties.").
21. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 20, at 1821-26 (causal explanation necessary to impose
liability; naked statistical evidence provides only causal prediction).
22. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1349; see also Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the
Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 34, 40 (1979) (following Tribe); Kaye, The Paradox of
the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 AiJz. ST. L.J. 101, 106 (also following Tribe). To
use one of the Sargent examples, if the plaintiff had the burden of showing that his decedent
did not die of cancer, the plaintiff's failure to offer evidence of a specific cause of death may
lead the factfinder to conclude that plaintiff's decedent more likely than not did die of cancer,
notwithstanding that a majority of men do not die of cancer.
For an explanation of courts' aversion to naked statistical evidence not based upon the
utility (or lack of utility) of such evidence in obtaining correct decisions, see Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Htv. L.
REv. 1357 (1985). Nesson argues that verdicts based solely on naked statistical evidence are
unacceptable because the judicial system strives to project an acceptable account of what
happened, and in such cases the public knows that the factfinder can do no more than make
a bet on the evidence. Id. at 1379.
23. See Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-
worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293, 327-28 (1985)
[hereinafter Brook, Use]; Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 870.
24. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 326.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 277-86 for a more detailed discussion.
26. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 303; see also Friese v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 324
Mass. 623, 631, 88 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1949) (citing Sargent and Smith for the proposition that
verdicts must rest on a solid foundation).
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evidence presented (taking into account, where appropriate, the nonprod-
uction of other evidence), reconsidering the Sargent and Smith facts and
concluding that the decisions were supportable does not solve the Sargent
problem. The Sargent language, with its ambiguous implications, still creates
confusion. 27
Res ipsa loquitur as a circumstantial evidence rule cuts through the
uncertainties presented by the various analyses of Sargent. Application of
the doctrine returns the factfinder's focus where it belongs: to what the
facts of the accident say about the likelihood of negligence and the defen-
dant's connection to it. If the facts of the accident are such that its cause
was more likely than not the defendant's negligence, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant. The degree of conviction in the factfinder's mind
and the type and quantity of evidence before the court are simply not in
issue. Although this approach is proper for all negligence cases, it is most
valuable where the complete story of the plaintiff's injury is unavailable
and the factfinder may be tempted to throw up its hands in confusion and
to not weigh the evidence before it.21
Notwithstanding the relatively simple concepts behind the res ipsa loquitur
circumstantial evidence rule, California courts have experienced a great deal
of difficulty in applying the rule. This difficulty has resulted from the
problems inherent in reducing a rule to a formula and mechanically applying
that formula without regard to its underlying purposes.29 The starting point
for the modern statement of the doctrine is the Wigmore formulation:
27. In Stepakoff, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court approved a trial court's
jury instruction it described as follows:
The judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving all
the essential elements of her case by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
Quoting from [Sargent], he told the jury that "[tihe weight or preponderance of
evidence is its power to convince the tribunal which has the determination of the
facts, of the actual truth of the proposition to be proved. After the evidence has
been weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if
it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its
truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal
notwithstanding any doubts that may linger there." The judge also stated:
"Another description of the state of mind which is satisfied by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence is a firm and abiding conviction in the truth of the
plaintiff's case. A third word picture of this burden of proof is a balance of
probability in favor of the plaintiff." Later in his charge, the judge told the jury
that the plaintiff had to prove "that her husband's death was more likely due
to the negligence of the defendant than to some other cause for which he is not
liable."
Stepakoff, 393 Mass. at 843, 473 N.E.2d at 1136.
28. One type of response has been to refer gratuitously to two possible causes of an
accident as "equally great," which if meant as "neither of which can be supported by the
evidence" may be acceptable, but if meant literally is almost certainly incorrect. See Jaffe,
supra note 11, at 4 (criticizing Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935)).
29. Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note 8, at 187-88.
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(1) [tlhe apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious
operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspec-
tion, or user; (2) both inspection and user must have been at the time
of the injury in the control of the party charged; (3) the injurious
occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any volun-
tary action at the time by the party injured. It may be added that the
particular force and justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption
throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists
in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to
the injured person."
The California Supreme Court quoted Prosser's restatement of Wigmore's
formula3' in Ybarra v. Spangard,32 and this language has been cited fre-
quently. 33
In unidentifiable tortfeasor cases, the requirement of most concern is the
second one-the requirement that the injury-causing instrument must have
been under the "control" of the defendant. California courts have some-
times viewed this requirement as being simply a way of determining whether
an injury was the result of the defendant's negligence.3 4 More often, the
control requirement has been treated as a special element to be shown. As
a consequence, courts have in some cases applied res ipsa loquitur without
sufficiently examining the possibility of negligence on the part of someone
other than the defendant 35 and, in other cases, courts have had to stretch
the control "rule" so as to enable the plaintiff to proceed. 36 Prosser's
remark that:
30. 9 J. ,VIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 2509 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1981).
31. (1) [Ihe event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, ToRTs, supra note 8, § 39, at 214. Prosser goes on to state that "this traditional
formula is neither complete nor accurate so far as it goes." Id.
32. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944). The court also quoted Wigmore's
statement concerning the accessibility of evidence to the defendant. Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at
689.
33. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 359, 540 P.2d 33, 39, 124 Cal. Rptr.
193, 199 (1975); Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 226 P.2d 574, 577 (1951).
34. See, e.g., Zentz, 39 Cal. 2d at 443, 247 P.2d at 348.
35. See, e.g., Newing, 15 Cal. 3d at 362-63, 540 P.2d at 41, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 201
(defendant's decedent controlled crashed airplane, so evidence of mechanical failure would not
have been relevant); Godfrey v. Brown, 220 Cal. 57, 29 P.2d 165 (1934) (two car collision
and plaintiff a passenger in car controlled by the defendant); cf. Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52
R.I. 151, 158 A. 720 (1932) (plaintiff in control of stool that broke while he sat on it).
36. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) and Gordon,
33 Cal. 2d at 514, 203 P.2d at 522, involving suits against the manufacturers of bottles which
exploded when picked up by the plaintiffs, the California Supreme Court held that the control
requirement could be satisfied by a showing that the defendant had control at the time of the
alleged negligent act and the condition of the instrumentality had not been changed after it
1990]
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[i]t would be far better, and much confusion would be avoided, if the
idea of "control" were to be discarded altogether, and if we were to
say merely that the apparent cause of the accident must be such that
the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with
it37
is still germane.
The problem presented by the unidentifiable tortfeasor cases, however, is
fundamental and does not turn on whether the requirement is cast in terms
of the defendant's "control" of the injury-causing instrument or its con-
nection with the alleged negligence. Where the facts disclose multiple de-
fendants acting independently, no one of which more likely than not
controlled the instrumentality or was connected with the negligence, no
case-circumstantial or otherwise-has been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence against any one of them.38 Courts sometimes fail to appreciate
this issue, 39 and occasionally consciously impose liability under these circum-
stances to promote separate policy goals. 40 The latter cases, the subject of
the next section of this Part, in fact take the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
well beyond the confines of a rule of circumstantial evidence. They also
highlight the fact that res ipsa loquitur, as a rule of circumstantial evidence,
simply does not work for the case of the unidentifiable tortfeasor.
In completing this discussion of the circumstantial evidence rule formu-
lation of res ipsa loquitur, it is worth noting the treatment of Wigmore's
statement concerning the rule's relationship to the defendant's accessibility
to the chief evidence of the case. 41 Although some California cases have
left the defendant's possession. In Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire, 39 Cal. 2d 481, 247 P.2d
335 (1952), the plaintiff was injured when a barstool broke while he was sitting on it and it
was held sufficient that the defendant had exclusive control as to construction, inspection and
maintenance of the stool.
37. Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note 8, at 201.
38. See Raber, 36 Cal. 2d at 662-63, 226 -P.2d at 579 (Traynor, J., dissenting and
concurring); Godfrey, 220 Cal. at 69, 29 P.2d at 170 (Thompson, J., dissenting); Seavey,
supra note 11, at 646.
39. In Raber, for example, the plaintiff was injured by a falling ladder while helping to
remodel a store. The only others in the building, one of whom presumably negligently placed
the ladder, were Tumin, the store owner, and Endriss, an employee of Tumin. Tumin should
have been responsible for either his or his employee's negligence, but Endriss should have
been responsible only for his own negligence. The court nonetheless held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur operated against each defendant, notwithstanding the lack of specific evidence
implicating either Tumin or Endriss. The distinction between Tumin and Endriss did not escape
the attention of Justice Traynor. See Raber, 36 Cal. 2d at 661-65, 226 P.2d at 578-81 (Traynor,
J., dissenting and concurring).
40. It is difficult to classify automobile collision cases such as Godfrey, 220 Cal. at 57, 29
P.2d at 165 (applying res ipsa loquitur against the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was
a passenger). Prosser's normally lucid discussion of the doctrine's history in California does
not adequately account for the results of the collision cases. See Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note
'8, at 204-08.
41. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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considered the "superior knowledge" of the defendant, 42 this superior
knowledge has been held not to be a prerequisite for the doctrine's appli-
cation.43 Prosser, moreover, considered the superior knowledge argument a
makeweight which accomplishes nothing but to make the basis for decisions
less clear.44 For res ipsa loquitur as a circumstantial evidence rule, this result
is correct. Although nonproduction of important evidence which should
have been available may affect the evaluation of the probabilities of the
defendant's negligence, 45 this does not, for the simple purpose of deciding
circumstantial evidence cases, require a formal burden-shifting doctrine. The
defendant's presumably superior access to relevant information, however,
serves as the foundation for the policy-driven version of res ipsa loquitur.
B. Enhanced Res Ipsa Loquitur
Courts have, in a group of cases, relied upon the defendant's presumably
superior access to relevant information to shift the burden of producing
evidence (if not the burden of proof) to the defendant. 46 Although decided
in the name of res ipsa loquitur, such cases in reality evidence a departure
from the use of the doctrine as a measure of the inferences permissible
from the evidence presented in pursuit of policy goals. 47 I will refer to this
policy-driven version of res ipsa loquitur as "enhanced res ipsa loquitur"
to differentiate it from the circumstantial evidence rule. 41
Enhanced res ipsa loquitur appears in two categories of cases. The first
consists of cases in which a special relationship exists between the plaintiff
and the defendant, and the courts have employed the doctrine to ensure
that in the event of uncertainty the loss falls on the defendant. The second
category consists of cases in which a special relationship may exist, but the
doctrine is primarily used to sanction the defendant for the nonavailability
of evidence.
42. See Zentz, 39 Cal. 2d at 445, 247 P.2d at 348.
43. See Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 501, 364 P.2d 337, 339, 15
Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (1961); Zentz, 39 Cal. 2d at 445, 247 P.2d at 349.
44. See W. PROSSER, ToRTs, supra note 8, § 39, at 225; Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note 8,
at 204. But see Jaffe, supra note 11, at 6 ("[Tlypically ... the defendant has greater access
to the facts than the plaintiff .... Res ipsa rests on the notion that it is fair to treat the
probability as the fact if the defendant has the power to rebut the inference.").
45. See Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 295, 188 P.2d 12, 14 (1947); see
also infra text accompanying note 79.
46. In Ybarra, (see infra text accompanying notes 91-102) Chief Justice Gibson, in resorting
to the "basic underlying purpose" and "the reason and spirit" of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, quoted Wigmore's proviso on the accessibility to evidence set forth at supra text
accompanying note 30. Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 489-90, 154 P.2d at 689.
47. Prosser recognized this policy-driven use of the doctrine at an early stage. See W.
PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 8, at 222-24.
48. It is unfortunate that the courts have not devised a new term for this new theory of
liability. Cf. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 15 (approving the use of res ipsa loquitur to revise
concepts of liability and proof).
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Enhanced res ipsa loquitur first appeared in cases involving suits by
passengers against common carriers. 49 Housel v. Pacific Electric Railway
Co.,50 involved a collision on the streets of Los Angeles between a hay
wagon and a street car bearing the plaintiff as a passenger. 51 The California
Supreme Court interpreted res ipsa loquitur, when applied to common
carrier cases, as providing "that proof of the injury to the passenger while
he was being carried as such creates a prima facie case or presumption of
negligence on the part of the carrier, which the carrier is called upon to
meet or rebut."52 The court reasoned that in view of the high degree of
care required of a carrier toward its passengers, "a collision would not
happen in the ordinary course of events if the carrier exercised such care
.... "51 The court also noted that "the means of proving the specific facts
as to the cause of the accident are peculiarly within the power of the carrier,
and the explanation should come from it, rather than from the passenger,
who very often is unable to ascertain and prove the real facts."54 In
Bourguignon v. Peninsular Railway Co., 55 the "rule" was reduced to the
following formula:
[W]here the accident is of such a character that it speaks for itself...
and raises a presumption of negligence, the defendant will not be held
blameless except upon a showing either (1) of a satisfactory explanation
of the accident, that is, an affirmative showing of a definite cause for
the accident in which cause no element of negligence on the part of the
defendant inheres, or (2) of such care in all possible respects as neces-
sarily to lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have happened
from want of care, but must have been due to some unpreventable
cause, although the exact cause is unknown. 6
49. Prosser notes that it was perhaps inevitable that "Baron Pollock's Latin phrase should
become involved in passenger cases, and that it should there cross-breed with the carrier's
burden of proof and produce a monster child." Prosser, Res Ipsa, supra note 8, at 186. In
Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1895), a case of similar vintage, res
ipsa loquitur was applied against the owner of a nitroglycerin factory, the explosion of whose
plant destroyed all evidence of its cause. The Judson facts, however, have fortunately proven
to be rare.
50. 167 Cal. 245, 139 P. 73 (1914).
51. The precise facts of the Housel case seem unlikely to be repeated.
52. Housel, 167 Cal. at 247, 139 P. at 74.
53. Id. at 249, 139 P. at 75.
54. Id. at 249-50, 139 P. at 75; see also Godfrey, 220 Cal. at 69-71, 29 P.2d at 170-71
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (describing common carrier rule as based on high standard of care
required of common carriers and common carriers' superior knowledge or means of infor-
mation).
55. 40 Cal. App. 689, 181 P. 669 (1919).
56. Id. at 694-95, 181 P. at 671 (California Supreme Court, on motion for rehearing en
banc). In Seffert, the California Supreme Court approved a trial court's res ipsa loquitur
instruction in a passenger's suit against a carrier similar to the Bourguignon formula while
also maintaining that "[sluperior knowledge by the defendant is not a prerequisite for the




The effect is to shift the burden of proof, and the loss if proof is unavailable,
to the carrier.
The California Supreme Court later employed enhanced res ipsa loquitur
as a products liability precursor in cases involving broken or exploded
beverage bottles.5 7 In these pre-strict liability cases, to recover from bottlers
plaintiffs were required to show either negligence in the bottling process or
a defective bottle coupled with negligent inspection for defects by the bottler.
The plaintiffs offered no specific evidence of either and the question
presented was whether res ipsa loquitur could be used against the defendants.
Much of the court's opinion in each case is spent resolving the question of
whether the defendant had sufficient "control" over the bottle in question
at the time of the accident for the application of the doctrine,58 but more
important for present purposes are the court's discussions of the permissi-
bility of inferring the defendant's negligence from the fact that the bottles
broke.
The issue was first debated in Honea v. City Dairy,5 9 a case concerning
a young girl injured by a milk bottle which "just broke" while she was
carrying it. The majority concluded that the court could not take judicial
notice "that defects [in glass bottles] will not ordinarily occur unless the
bottler is negligent,"' 6 and consequently disallowed application of the doc-
trine. The dissent argued:61 (1) bottles do not ordinarily break unless they
are defective; (2) the bottler had a duty to inspect the bottle and discover
any defects; and (3) based upon evidence that "a defect would be discov-
erable by reasonable inspection," 62 failure to inspect or negligent inspection
may be inferred from the fact that the defect was not discovered. In Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 63 a case involving a waitress injured by an
exploding Coca Cola bottle, the court64 noted testimony concerning bottle
57. These cases include Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 453, 150 P.2d at 436, Gordon, 33 Cal. 2d
at 514, 203 P.2d at 522 and Zentz, 39 Cal. 2d at 436, 247 P.2d at 344; see also Hoffing v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948) (following Escola).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37. The "control" issue serves in this instance
as a surrogate for proximate causation analysis. Cf. Rose, 39 Cal. 2d at 486-87, 247 P.2d at
338 (sufficient that defendant had exclusive control of collapsed bar stool so far as construction,
inspection or maintenance was concerned; no consequence that plaintiff was in control of the
stool while he was sitting on it).
59. 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
60. Id. at 620, 140 P.2d at 372.
61. Id. at 623-27, 140 P.2d at 374-76 (Carter, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed to
the bottler's superior position to explain what would have been required to discover the defect.
Id. at 624-25, 140 P.2d at 374-75.
62. Id. at 623, 140 P.2d at 374.
63. 24 Cal. 2d at 453, 150 P.2d at 436.
64. It is interesting to note that the majority opinions in Honea, Escola, Zentz and Ybarra
were all written by Chief Justice Phil Gibson.
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
testing practices and essentially followed the reasoning of the Honea
dissent.65
The cases use the language of res ipsa loquitur,66 but in fact much more
is going on. A rule that, because practicable tests are available, any failure
to detect a defect may be presumed negligent puts the bottler in a very
disadvantageous position.67 There is no cost-benefit analysis of available
tests, 8 and even if a bottler performs complete testing, if in some instances
the tests are not accurate the bottler would still be liable. As Justice Traynor
noted in his Escola concurrence,6 9 the result is close to a rule of strict
liability. The court used res ipsa loquitur to promote a policy of shifting
defective product losses from consumer to producer.
The most prominent cases in which enhanced res ipsa loquitur has been
used to sanction the defendants for the nonavailability of evidence are
Dierman v. Providence HospitaP and Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel.7' Mabel
Dierman was injured during surgery when the electric needle being used to
remove a wart from her nose ignited the gas used as an anesthetic. 72 The
65. The court reasoned that the explosion must have been caused by an overcharging of
the bottle with gas or a defect in the bottle, the bottler being responsible for the former and
for negligent inspection for the latter. The bottlemaker conducted extensive tests, so it was
not likely that bottles were delivered to the bottler with defects which could not have been
discovered by the bottler by visual inspection. The court further suggested that if latent defects
could occur after manufacturing, bottles should not be reused unless subjected to the same
sort of tests conducted by the manufacturer. See Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 459-61, 150 P.2d at
439-40. Escola was followed in Gordon, 33 Cal. 2d at 517-18, 203 P.2d at 524 (exploding beer
bottle) and Zentz, 39 Cal. 2d at 449, 247 P.2d at 351 (exploding Coca Cola bottle).
66. Zentz, for example, contains a thorough discussion of the rules of the doctrine. Zentz,
39 Cal. 2d at 440-47, 247 P.2d at 346-50.
67. See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 12 ("[Escola] talks the language of res ipsa and liability
rather indiscriminately.").
68. Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (probability
cost-benefit test).
69. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). Traynor was
critical and would have instead imposed liability without negligence. In Gordon, he expressed
his disapproval of the use of res ipsa loquitur as follows:
By approving the res ipsa loquitur instructions given in this case, the majority
opinion leaves it to the jury to hold defendant strictly liable not only for defects
in its bottles when they leave its control but also for defects that develop in the
normal course of marketing procedures. If such liability is to be imposed it
should be imposed openly and not by spurious application of rules developed to
determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in negligence cases.
Gordon, 33 Cal. 2d at 530, 203 P.2d at 532 (Traynor, J., concurring). That the application
of res ipsa loquitur can effectively change the applicable standard of care was also recognized
by other contemporary observers. See, e.g., Hinds v. Wheadon, 67 Cal. App. 2d 456, 465,
154 P.2d 720, 724 (1945) (insisting that res ipsa loquitur "is a rule of evidence and not of
liability and it does not impose upon one charged with negligence the duty of exercising a
higher degree of care than would be required of him in a case where the doctrine was
inapplicable").
70. 31 Cal. 2d at 290, 188 P.2d at 12.
71. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
72. Dierman, 31 Cal. 2d at 291-92, 188 P.2d at 12-13.
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explosion could have been caused by the use of an improper gas, gas
contaminated by an unclean anesthetizing apparatus, gas contaminated by
the hospital or gas contaminated when purchased by the hospital from the
manufacturer. 73 The defendant doctor and nurse described the accident and
procedures followed but did not offer proof either as to whether the gas
was pure or whether they were responsible for its impurity. 74 The jury was
instructed on res ipsa loquitur and returned a verdict for the defendants,
but the California Supreme Court reversed. 75
The Dierman case contains elements of a special relationship between
defendant and plaintiff 6 and the majority quotes the Bourguignon formula, 77
but California courts in general have not imposed a duty upon physicians
and hospitals above a simple negligence standard. 78 The most noteworthy
element of the majority opinion, however, is an extended criticism of the
defendants' failure to produce the tank of gas used, a chemical analysis of
its contents, evidence of the condition of the tank or the circumstances
under which it was stored. The court concluded:
In a res ipsa loquitur case where, in addition to the prima facie showing
of negligence, it is admitted or appears beyond dispute that the defendant
has it in his power to produce substantial evidence material to the issue
but fails to do so, it must be presumed that such evidence, if produced,
would have been adverse to defendant, and under such circumstances
the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for the defendant and
plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict."9
Because, as Justice Traynor noted in dissent, 0 the relevant time for testing
the content of the gas container was the time of the accident and not the
time of the trial, the majority's approach attacks more than a failure to
produce available evidence at trial; rather, the majority believed such
evidence should have been available and sanctioned the defendants for its
nonavailability.8'
73. Id. at 292-93, 188 P.2d at 13.
74. Id. at 293-94, 188 P.2d at 13-14.
75. Id. at 292, 188 P.2d at 13.
76. See Raber, 36 Cal. 2d. at 664, 226 P.2d at 580 (Traynor, J., dissenting and concurring)
("The relationship between an unconscious patient and those who have undertaken to treat
him may also be (a situation] that justifies placing the burden of proof on the attendants
77. Dierman, 31 Cal. 2d at 295, 188 P.2d at 15; see supra text accompanying note 56.
78. Cf. Clark, 66 Cal. 2d at 414-21, 426 P.2d at 535-40, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 135-40 (Tobriner,
J., concurring) (advocating strict liability for rare operating room injuries).
79. Dierman, 31 Cal. 2d at 295, 188 P.2d at 14 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 299, 188 P.2d at 17 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
81. See id. ("If liability of defendants followed as a matter of law from their failure to
preserve such a container or to account for its absence, they would be penalized for failing
to anticipate a lawsuit and to prepare their defense thereto.").
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Haft involved the drowning of Morris Haft and his five-year-old son in
a motel pool in Palm Springs. In contravention of a state statute, the motel
had neither provided a lifeguard nor posted a warning sign at the pool. 2
The court resolved one issue in the case by concluding that the liability of
a pool owner who has provided neither a lifeguard nor a warning sign
should be measured with respect to the failure to provide a lifeguard. 3 A
second issue concerned the burden of proof as to cause-in-fact (i.e.,
whether the Hafts were responsible for their own drowning). This was
also resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Although the court alluded to the
special duty of an innkeeper to his guests, 4 its principal rationale was
that the lack of proof as to causation was a direct and foreseeable result
of the defendants' negligent failure to provide a lifeguard.15 The court
noted that although the main purpose of a lifeguard is to aid those in
danger, "an attentive guard does serve the subsidiary function of wit-
nessing those accidents that do occur." '8 6 Because the defendants were
responsible for the nonavailability of evidence they were sanctioned with
the imposition of the burden of proof. Haft has been followed in multiple
collision cases to impose liability upon the defendant responsible for the
later collision where that collision made unascertainable the extent of
damage caused by the earlier collision. 7
The enhanced res ipsa loquitur cases, whether special relationship cases
or sanction for nonavailability of evidence cases, ignore whether the defen-
dant actually had relevant information that could have been produced at
trial. Thus, more is involved than a failure to produce evidence affecting
the probability that the defendant was negligent,88 and the relevance of these
cases is not entirely eliminated by modern discovery rules.8 9 Rather, enhanced
res ipsa loquitur, under the name of res ipsa loquitur and upon a foundation
82. Haft, 3 Cal. 3d at 762-63, 478 P.2d at 467-68, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48.
83. Id. at 766-69, 478 P.2d at 470-72, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 750-52.
84. The opinion speaks of the pool owner's "paying patron" and notes that the pool
owner "profits from the presence of the pool." Id. at 774-75, 478 P.2d at 477, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 757.
85. Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
86. Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 474, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754; cf. Smith v. Americania Motor
Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1974) (absence of safety rope at pool did not
adversely affect availability of evidence of causation).
87. See, e.g., Vahey v. Sacia, 126 Cal. App. 3d 171, 178 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1981) (in multiple
collision, driver of fifth car had burden of proof as to causation of fourth car driver's injuries
where not clear whether injuries attributable to first or second collision); Lareau v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975) (railroad had burden of
proof as to causation of death where decedent was first injured in car collision and then killed
by train).
88. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89. The rule may have a bearing on incentives to create and maintain information that
could become relevant at trial. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on
the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. Rav. 713, 733-34 (1982).
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of "superior access to information," represents a new rule of liability: If
evidence is not available and either the defendant has a special relationship
with the plaintiff or the defendant is responsible for the nonavailability of
evidence, the defendant is liable.
Unlike res ipsa loquitur in the ordinary sense, 9° enhanced res ipsa loquitur
may be employed with substantial impact in unidentifiable tortfeasor cases.
The leading example of this is Ybarra v. Spangard.91 The facts of Ybarra
are sketchy but simple. Joseph Ybarra entered the hospital for surgery and
subsequently developed paralysis and atrophy in his shoulder. 92 Evidence
was introduced to the effect that Ybarra's condition resulted from pressure
or strain applied between his shoulder and neck and could have occurred
during surgery.93 The defendants included most of the doctors and nurses
who attended Ybarra during his hospital stay and were related (as employees
or independent contractors) in a variety of ways which would not normally
make any one of them responsible for the conduct of all of the others.94
The court's opinion, although brief, is wide-ranging and speaks to the
issues at hand in a variety of voices. The Ybarra decision can be attributed
to the defendants' superior access to relevant information 9 and categorized
either as a special duty case96 or as a sanction for nonavailability of evidence
case. 97 There is also a strong element of common enterprise or joint
90. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
91. 25 Cal. 2d at 486, 154 P.2d at 687.
92. Id. at 487-88, 154 P.2d at 688.
93. Id. at 488, 154 P.2d at 688.
94. Id. at 491-92, 154 P.2d at 690.
95. See Jaffe, supra note 11, at 8. The court said, for example, "Without the aid of the
doctrine a patient ... would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in
attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts
establishing liability" and quoted Wigmore's remarks with respect to access to information.
Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
96. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 8, § 39, at
223. The court said, for example, "The passenger sitting awake in a railroad car at the time
of a collision, the pedestrian walking along the street and struck by a falling object or the
debris of an explosion, are surely not more entitled to an explanation than the unconscious
patient on the operating table," Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 490, 154 P.2d at 689, and "[e]very
defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed for any period was bound to exercise
ordinary care to see that no unnecessary harm came to him." Id. at 491, 154 P.2d at 690.
97. See W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 8, § 39, at 223 (suggesting the opinion was an
attempt to break the conspiracy of silence in the medical profession). The court said, for
example, "The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various agencies or
instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant
or of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think, places upon them the burden of
initial explanation," Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 492, 154 P.2d at 690, and "[i]f [the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur were not applicable] the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to
invoke the principles of absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, in actions by persons
suffering injuries during the course of treatment under anesthesia." Id. at 490-91, 154 P.2d
at 689. On retrial, the doctors and nurses testified, but the trial court nevertheless found for




tortfeasor treatment.9 Finally, the case can be seen as a unique, result-
oriented decision. 99
Ybarra is best viewed, however, as an early example of California courts'
willingness to stretch existing theories and to devise new tort doctrines to
aid worthy plaintiffs in unidentifiable tortfeasor cases. Ybarra broke new
ground. None of the strands discussed was enough by itself to support a
decision for the plaintiff, but taken together they provided a basis to grant
relief. The Ybarra "holding" has been followed to varying extents in
subsequent cases involving operating room mishaps,10° but, of greater im-
portance, the Ybarra result has been referred to appiovingly in doctrine-
expanding cases such as Haft,, Summers v. Tice'0 and Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories.0 2 Enhanced res ipsa loquitur as used in Ybarra is a forerunner
of express theories of liability designed to address the unidentifiable tort-
feasor problem.
C. The Concerted Action and Alternative Liability
Theories of Liability
Enhanced res ipsa loquitur is a new theory of liability under the guise of
allocating burdens of proof. The next stage in the doctrinal progression 0 3
was the development of two express theories of liability suitable for appli-
cation in unidentifiable tortfeasor cases: the concerted action theory and
the alternative liability theory. Concerted action and alternative liability are
similar in that both involve defendants taking complementary actions and
98. See Clark, 66 Cal. 2d at 411, 426 P.2d at 533, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The court said,
for example, "A hospital today conducts a highly integrated system of activities, with many
persons contributing their efforts," Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 493, 154 P.2d at 691, and "[t]he
defendant employers would be liable for the neglect of their employees; and the doctor in
charge of the operation would be liable for the negligence of those who became his temporary
servants for the purpose of assisting in the operation." Id. at 492, 154 P.2d at 690.
99. See Seavey, supra note 11, at 646. The court said, for example, "The present case is
of a type which comes within the reason and spirit of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] more
fully perhaps than any other," Ybarra, 25 Cal. 2d at 490, 154 P.2d at 689, and "[wle do not
at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be applied
to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked." Id. at 494, 154 P.2d
at 691.
100. See, e.g., Clark, 66 Cal. 2d at 399, 426 P.2d at 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 125; Quintal,
62 Cal. 2d at 154, 397 P.2d at 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 577; Leonard v. Watsonville Community
Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915
(1955); Dierman, 31 Cal. 2d at 290, 188 P.2d at 12; Oldis v. La Societe Francaise de
Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 130 Cal. App. 2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1955).
101. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
102. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).




the doctrines are often called into play in comparable factual situations.' °4
Their theoretical underpinnings, however, are quite different.
Concerted action is a joint tortfeasor doctrine. As described by Prosser
and Keeton, the doctrine provides that joint liability is imposed upon "[a]ll
those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious
act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who
lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the
wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit."' 0 An express agreement among
the defendants is not necessary and a tacit understanding will suffice,1'1 but
it is "essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with
responsibility shall be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with the intent
requisite to committing a tort, or with negligence." 10 7 The classic example
of the concerted action theory is the case of an unlawful car race between
A and B which results in a collision between B's car and a car driven by
C. Under the concerted action theory, A and B are engaged in a common
tortious enterprise and C may maintain an action against A even though
their cars did not touch.108
The leading California concerted action case dealing with the unidentifi-
able tortfeasor problem is Orser v. George. 1O9rser arose from an accidental
shooting at a duck club outing. Vierra, Jacobson and James negligently
fired a number of shots at a mudhen.1' 0 Orser, who was working in a field
and in the line of fire, was killed by a pistol bullet."' Vierra (and possibly
Jacobson) fired the fatal pistol and James fired a rifle." 2 The court found
that James must nevertheless be held as a defendant because:
the record [of James firing alternately with Vierra at the same mudhen
and in the same line of fire] permits a possibility James knew Vierra's
conduct constituted a breach of duty owed Orser and that James was
giving Vierra substantial "assistance or encouragement"; also that this
was substantial assistance to Vierra in a tortious result with James' own
104. The doctrines are considered frequently, for example, in cases involving mishaps with
firearms. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
964 (1975) (alternative liability); Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 80, 199 P.2d at I (alternative liability);
Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967) (concerted action); Moore
v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938) (concerted action); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852,
110 So. 666 (1927) (concerted action).
105. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 46, at 323.
106. Id. at 323.
107. Id. at 324. The concerted action theory is somewhat akin to criminal conspiracy theory,
although an agreement itself can be a crime but cannot amount to a tort without the infliction
of some harm. See id.
108. See Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960).
109. 252 Cal. App. 2d at 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
110. Id. at 665-66, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
111. Id. at 664, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
112. Id. at 666, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
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conduct, "separately considered, constituting a breach of duty to"
Orser.113
Once concerted action is shown, particular causation is irrelevant and the
problem of identifying the particular agent of causation is solved: All
defendants participating in the common enterprise are responsible for the
plaintiff's harm. The challenge lies in determining whether the conduct by
the defendants in a particular instance constitutes tortious "concerted ac-
tion." Express agreements with respect to tortious enterprises are not
common and are in any event difficult to prove. Determining whether the
course of conduct undertaken by the defendants evidences an implied
understanding, on the other hand, requires difficult line drawing.
These difficulties are illustrated by Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 114 a federal district court case suggesting a variant on the concerted
action theory sometimes referred to as "enterprise liability.""' 9 Hall involved
a lawsuit against all six American manufacturers of dynamite blasting caps.
The plaintiff children were injured while playing with blasting caps which,
contained no warning label and could be easily detonated; individual man-
ufacturers of specific caps could not be identified." 6 The court found
sufficient allegations of joint control of risk on the part of the defendants
through common adherence to industry safety standards and delegation of
functions of safety investigation and design to a jointly sponsored trade
association." 7 The result may very well have differed, however, depending
upon factors such as the structure of the industry, the product, the alleged
defect and the use made of the trade association. In industrial unidentifiable
tortfeasor cases, the application of concerted action theory principles is far
from simple.
The case establishing the alternative liability theory is Summers v. Tice."8
Summers, Tice and Simonson went quail hunting and, despite admonitions
to "keep in line," the hunters ended up being positioned at the points of
a triangle." 9 Tice and Simonson each shot at a quail and one shot, from
either Tice's or Simonson's gun, hit Summers in the eye.12° The trial court
found that both Tice and Simonson were negligent in firing in Summers'
direction and that Summers was not contributorily negligent.' 2'
113. Id. at 668, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
114. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The decision was rendered in the context of a
motion by the defendants for dismissal or for severance and transfer of the case. Because of
unresolved choice of law questions, the case was decided assuming "the existence of a national
body of state tort law." Id. at 360.
115. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 607, 607 P.2d at 933-34, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42.
116. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 359.
117. Id. at 375-76.
118. 33 Cal. 2d at 80, 199 P.2d at 1.
119. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2.
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In considering the case, the California Supreme Court had before it two
Mississippi precedents in which two persons had fired shots simultaneously
but only one, who could not be identified, had hit another person. Oliver
v. Miles,'2 involving two hunters who negligently fired across a road and
hit a passerby, and Moore v. Foster,'23 involving two policemen who
wrongfully fired at a fleeing suspect, had each been resolved on the theory
that the defendants' activity constituted concerted action. In Summers,
however, the court did not rely on the concerted action theory, perhaps
because the plaintiff had neglected to proceed on that theory at the trial
court level.' 4 Instead, the court reasoned that because the defendants were
both wrongdoers and created the situation where the negligence of one of
them injured the plaintiff, the burden should rest with each defendant to
absolve himself or be jointly liable for the whole damages. 2 Like enhanced
res ipsa loquitur, Summers has been applied in multiple collision cases. 26
In general, however, incidents of contemporaneous negligence by two or
more defendants resulting in an untraceable injury have apparently been
rare and the Summers rule has not often been found controlling. 2 7
The concerted action theory, as a theoretical matter, fits neatly into the
category of joint torts, the concerted action of the defendants constituting
a central element of the tort. The alternative liability theory is quite different.
Whether expressed in terms of a mere projection of proper behavioral
norms 28 or unfair liability for at least one defendant for an injury he did
not cause, 29 Summers represents the imposition of liability for negligent
122. 144 Miss. at 852, 110 So. at 666.
123. 182 Miss. at 15, 180 So. at 73.
124. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. This failure on the plaintiff's part is spelled
out more clearly in the court of appeal opinion. See Summers v. Tice, 190 P.2d 963, 967
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (opinion vacated). It can also be maintained that negligently firing
in Summers' direction was a "one shot deal" and that, unlike shooting across a pond (Orser)
or deliberately trying to bring down a fleeing misdemeanant (Moore), Tice and Simonson were
not engaged in wrongful conduct; their overall enterprise (quail hunting) was not only not
inherently tortious but included Summers.
125. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
126. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Alameda, 49 Cal. 2d 674, 681-83, 321 P.2d 1, 6-7 (1958) (Traynor,
J., dissenting); Vahey, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 171, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
127. See, e.g., Vecchione v. Carlin, I11 Cal. App. 3d 351, 168 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980) (One
possible cause of infant's death was defendants' action; another possible cause was preexisting
medical condition.); Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1978) (suit against two manufacturers only one of which made defective product); Eley v.
Curzon, 121 Cal. App. 2d 280, 263 P.2d 86 (1953) (pedestrian may not have been struck by
any of the defendants); see also Burton, 502 F.2d at 1261 (seven officers fired at demonstrators
without privilege, 31 fired with privilege). Summers was incorrectly applied in Litzmann v.
Humboldt County, 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). In Litzmann, a child was injured by
an aerial bomb negligently left at a fairgrounds by one of two defendants. The court found
that both defendants could be held liable notwithstanding that one defendant had clearly not
left the bomb or otherwise breached any duty toward the plaintiff.
128. See Nesson, supra note 22, at 1384.
129. See Wright, supra note 20, at 1817-18 (arguing that the Summers rationale is more a
penal argument than a tort argument).
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risk creation and represents a major departure from traditional principles
of tort law. 30 In allocating the burden of loss between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, Summers comes very close to endorsing the
concept of "negligence in the air."''
Notwithstanding their differences, the concerted action and alternative
liability theories have each provided an express doctrine for dealing with
unidentifiable tortfeasor cases. By admitting the formulation of independent
theories of liability, each moves beyond the groping of Ybarra to a rule-
system by. which liability may be determined. These theories of liability
provide the principal backdrop for the most challenging unidentifiable
tortfeasor cases presented to date-those involving lawsuits by women
injured in utero by DES.
II. THE UNIDENTIABLE TORTFEASOR AND THE DES CAsEs
A. The Market Share Answer to the DES Causation Problem
The unidentifiable tortfeasor issue has been brought to the fore in the
last several years with the emergence of claims against the manufacturers
of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) and the landmark California Supreme
Court decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.32 DES is a synthetic
estrogenic hormone first synthesized by a group of British medical research-
ers in the late 1930s.33 A number of drug companies thereafter filed New
Drug Applications (NDAs) with the Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) requesting authorization to produce and market DES for several
purposes, none related to problems in pregnancy. Following an FDA request
for information pooling in late 1940, several drug companies formed a
"small committee" to coordinate the joint submission of clinical data on
DES in a "master file" to be used with respect to all DES NDAs. The
FDA approved the marketing of DES for nonpregnancy uses in late 1941.
Supplemental NDAs for the use of DES as a miscarriage preventative were
filed in 1947. A few companies conducted experiments on the safety and
efficacy of DES for this purpose, but most relied instead upon published
studies done by independent researchers at several medical schools. The
FDA approved the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative in July
130. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 882-83.
131. See id. at 883. But cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928) (proof of "negligence in the air" not sufficient).
132. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
133. The DES fact discussion presented here is taken primarily from Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 587-90, 689 P.2d 368, 373-74 (1984), Collins v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 177-81, 342 N.W.2d 37, 43-44, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) and
Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative
Solution, 73 CAUi'. L. REv. 941, 943-45 (1985).
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1947. Following a study linking a form of cancer in young women with the
use of DES by their mothers during pregnancy, the FDA contraindicated
DES for use for the prevention of miscarriages in November 1971.
Although there were apparently a few principal producers, 34 as many as
200 to 300 companies manufactured and marketed DES between 1947 and
1971. As described by one court:
Some companies marketed the drug under a trade name; others marketed
it generically. Several companies supplied DES to competitors. Because
the DES compounds produced by the drug companies were chemically
identical, pharmacists often filled prescriptions for DES with whatever
company's drug was in stock, a practice that the firms were aware of.
None of the companies warned physicians about the possibility of
carcinogenic or other risks to the offspring of women who took DES. 35
In fact, a number of the daughters of women who ingested DES during
pregnancy have suffered clear cell adenocarcinoma, a fast-spreading vaginal
and cervical cancer requiring radical surgery, and many more have suffered
adenosis, a vaginal tract abnormality of uncertain import. 36 Clear cell
adenocarcinoma is extremely rare outside of the DES context 37 and has a
minimum latent period of ten to twelve years.' Plaintiffs allege that drug
companies did inadequate testing, knew or should have known that DES
was unsafe and failed to give adequate warnings of its potential danger.'39
A significant difficulty facing DES plaintiffs has been an inability to
identify any particular drug company as the producer of the DES ingested
by their mothers. The DES problem is widespread with numerous actors
(both drug companies and victims) and no unity of time or place, either
with respect to the tortious 4° acts performed or the injuries incurred. The
difficulty in identifying particular tortfeasors results from both the time
past and the indistinct marketing of DES. Memories have faded and records
134. The plaintiff in Sindell asserted that Eli Lilly and Company and five or six other
companies produced 90% of the DES marketed for the prevention of miscarriages. Sindell,
26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
135. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 589, 689 P.2d at 374.
136. Compare Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoiwAM
L. REv. 963, 965 & n.10 (1978) (adenosis may be precancerous) with Schwartz & Mahshigian,
supra note 133, at 945 ("Adenosis has not been shown to be a precancerous condition and it
seems to regress and disappear over time.").
137. See Comment, supra note 136, at 965 & n.8.
138. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
139. See, e.g., id. at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
140. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the DES plaintiffs will be able to
prove wrongful conduct on the part of DES manufacturers. Jury verdicts have to date not
been uniform. Compare Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982)
(affirming $500,000 verdict for plaintiff) and Needham v. White Laboratories, No. 76-1101
(N.D. II1. Aug. 27, 1979) ($800,000 verdict for plaintiff), rev'd, 1980-1981 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 8875 (7th Cir. 1981) with Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 75-70997 (E.D. Mich. Nov.
21, 1980) (verdict for defendant).
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have been lost or destroyed 141 and there were many manufacturers of a
relatively fungible product. Although plaintiffs have asserted that the drug
companies should bear the responsibility for the generic use of the drug 42
and defendants have countered that the plaintiffs' mothers had better access
to their particular prescription information, 143 plaintiffs' inability to identify
particular tortfeasors cannot be squarely blamed on either party.1" As one
commentator has observed, the DES cases may be one of the rare instances
"in which useful, nonquantitative evidence is all but impossible to obtain."' 45
The Sindell case was brought against eleven drug manufacturers by Judith
Sindell, a DES daughter who suffered a malignant bladder tumor and
adenosis. 46 The suit was brought as a class action requesting compensatory
and punitive damages for Sindell and equitable relief for the class. 47 Sindell
pleaded a number of theories of liability' 4 and alleged concerted action and
a joint enterprise on the part of the defendants in an effort to make them
jointly liable. 149 Sindell acknowledged that she could not identify the man-
ufacturer of the particular DES taken by her mother. 50 The trial court
dismissed the action on the basis of Sindell's inability to identify a particular
manufacturer,15 ' but the court of appeal reversed, holding that the plaintiff
could proceed on both the concerted action and alternative liability theories
of liability. 52
141. In Michigan, for example, state law requires the preservation of the prescription records
of pharmacies for only five years. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 321, 343
N.W.2d 164, 168, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
142. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
143. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 84, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730,
734 (1978) (plaintiff's mother knew of and possessed prescription; plaintiff's mother selected
the doctor and the pharmacy involved).
144. This is what the court concluded in Sindell. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 607 P.2d at
930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
145. Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked
Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. BAR FoUND. Ras. J. 487, 489 [hereinafter
Kaye, Limits].
146. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
147. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Sindell asked that the defendants
be ordered to warn of the danger of DES and the need for certain tests and to establish free
clinics to perform such tests. Id. "The plaintiff class consist[ed] of 'girls and women who are
residents of California and who have been exposed to DES before birth and who may or may
not know that fact or the dangers' to which they were exposed." Id. at 593 n.l, 607 P.2d at
925 n.l, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.1.
148. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. These theories included negligence,
strict products liability, lack of informed consent, breach of express warranties, breach of
implied warranties, fraud and violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
149. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
150. Id. at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
151. Id. at 596, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
152. See Abbott, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 143-50.
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The California Supreme Court also reversed the trial court, 53 but not for
the reasons articulated by the court of appeal. The California Supreme
Court rejected concerted action, alternative liability and other unidentifiable
tortfeasor theories of liability154 but instead fashioned a new theory of
liability known as "market share liability." The market share liability rule
generally works as follows: If (1) the plaintiff is innocent, (2) the defendants
are negligent (at least in general terms), (3) the plaintiff's injury was caused
by a uniform product, 5 5 (4) the plaintiff, through no fault of her own,
cannot identify the particular manufacturer responsible for her harm and
(5) the plaintiff has joined as defendants the manufacturers of a substantial
share of the product that caused her injury, then the burden shifts to each
defendant to either demonstrate that it could not have made the particular
product that caused the plaintiff's injury or assume liability for the plaintiff's
loss in proportion to its market share. 56
The court elected to devise a remedy because, as between an innocent
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the
injury. 57 The court also reasoned that in "our contemporary complex
industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible
goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any
specific producer" and courts should fashion remedies to meet changing
needs, just as courts created strict products liability to adapt to "an era of
mass production and complex marketing methods."' 58 In the DES context,
the court found it reasonable to measure the likelihood that any of the
defendants produced the actual injury-causing product "by the percentage
which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing
miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that
purpose.'" 9
153. Under California law, a grant of hearing by the supreme court vacates a court of
appeal decision. The supreme court then considers the case as if it were on direct appeal from
the trial court.
154. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 598-610, 607 P.2d at 928-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-43. The court
also rejected enhanced res ipsa loquitur as embodied in Haft and the enterprise liability
advanced in Hall. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87, 114-17; see infra text accompanying
notes 239-41, 255-58.
155. Product uniformity is not an entirely accurate description of the DES situation. See
infra text accompanying notes 208-09.
156. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. There
appears to be no requirement that defendants have better access to relevant information than
do the plaintiffs.
157. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
158. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)); see also
Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1070, 751 P.2d 470, 483, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424-
25 (1988).
159. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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B. Sindell's Unanswered Questions
In establishing market share liability in Sindell, the California Supreme
Court left open a number of important questions relating to the doctrine's
application, only some of which have been addressed in subsequent DES
cases. The first of these questions concerns the standard of care required
of DES manufacturers and the related issue of which specific causes of
action can be pursued on a market share theory when a particular responsible
defendant is unidentifiable. In Sindell, the plaintiff pleaded a number of
causes of action and requested punitive damages. 16 Although the majority
opinion in Sindell uses the language of negligence,' 6' the court did not
address specifically the standard of care to be applied.
Most of the cause of action/market share questions were addressed directly
in the California Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. Superior
Court of San Francisco. 62 Brown involved at least sixty-nine individual DES
cases that were consolidated for the purpose of deciding common legal
questions. On appeal from pretrial rulings adverse to the plaintiffs, the
court decided that drug manufacturers could not be held strictly liable for
a defect in the design of a prescription drug. 6 That determination was not
based on the market share theory, but on "the public interest in the
development, availability and reasonable price of drugs."'
The court also determined that neither a breach of express or implied
warranty claim nor a fraud claim could be pursued on a market share
theory, the former because recovery on a warranty theory would be incon-
sistent with the court's resolution of the strict liability question,1 6 and the
latter because an essential element of a fraud claim is the state of mind of
a particular manufacturer, a showing too individualized to resolve on a
market share basis.1 6 Although the punitive damages issue was not addressed
in Brown, the court's fraud analysis suggests that punitive damages cannot
be recovered under a market share theory. 67
160. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
161. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 ("as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants" (emphasis added)).
162. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
163. Id. at 1057-69, 751 P.2d at 475-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 416-24.
164. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418. The court adopted comment k to
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the court viewed as imposing "liability
on a drug manufacturer only if it failed to warn of a defect of which it either knew or should
have known." Id. at 1059, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417. See generally Abraham,
Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA.
L. Rav. 845, 854-59 (1987) (discussion of standard of care issues in the mass tort context).
165. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072, 751 P.2d at 484, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
166. Id. at 1071, 751 P.2d at 484, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
167. See also Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1985) (punitive damages not recoverable under market share theory).
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It is also worth noting that arguments more relevant to the standard of
care question can easily enter the debate on the merits of the market share
theory.16s This is the case in both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Sindell, the majority characterizing the defendants as better cost spreaders'6 9
and the dissent charging that market share liability will inevitably inhibit
the dissemination of new drugs.170 The Brown decision will, one hopes,
serve as a focal point for the standard of care debate and allow market
share liability to be analyzed on its merits as an unidentifiable tortfeasor
doctrine.
A second question left open by Sindell but resolved by Brown is whether,
under a market share theory, the defendants before the court are jointly
liable for all of the plaintiff's losses (with the defendants' market shares
being used simply to apportion damages among the defendants) or whether
the defendants are only severally liable for a percentage of the plaintiff's
losses equal to each defendant's market share.171 Viewed another way, do
the defendants (through higher payments) or the plaintiff (through a less
than full recovery) absorb a loss for the market share of manufacturers
who are out of business, bankrupt, not amenable to service of process or
otherwise not joined as defendants in the action?
The majority opinion in Sindell can be read either way. The opinion refers
to apportioning damages among the defendants, states that the defendants
may cross-complain against other DES manufacturers and confesses that "a
defendant may be held liable for a somewhat different percentage of the
damage than its share of the appropriate market would justify."' 72 On the
other hand, the opinion asserts that each defendant will only be liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market, manufac-
turers will not be held responsible for the products of another and "each
manufacturer's liability for an injury would be approximately equivalent to
the damages caused by the DES it manufactured."' 7 Most commentators have
168. Cf. Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARv. L. Rv. 668, 674-75 (1981) (advantage of Sindell is-that it will result in greater emphasis
placed on standard of care questions).
169. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
170. Id. at 619, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Richardson, J., dissenting);
see also McCreery, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
171. Assume, for example, plaintiff's damages are $300, defendant A has a 50% market
share, defendant B has a 25% market share and no other defendants are joined. If defendants
are jointly liable, the plaintiff recovers $300, $200 of which (50/75 of the judgment) is paid
by defendant A and $100 of which (25/75 of the judgment) is paid by defendant B. If
defendants are only severally liable, the plaintiff recovers $225 (leaving $75 unrecovered),
defendant A pays $150 (50/100 of plaintiff's damages) and defendant B pays $75 (25/100 of
plaintiff's damages).
172. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
173. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
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read Sindell as imposing only several liability, 7 4 but others, including the
Sindell dissent, 175 have read Sindell to impose liability for 100% of the
plaintiff's damages. 76 Of the three other state supreme courts adopting a
market share type theory, one opted for a variant on joint liability,'" one
opted for several liability17 and the third took an intermediate course. 79
In Brown, the California Supreme Court rejected the joint liability inter-
pretation and concluded that, under a market share theory, "each defendant
should be liable only for the portion of a plaintiff's damages that corre-
sponds to the percentage of its share of the relevant market for DES.' '80
The court recognized that joint liability may subject a defendant to a
portion of the judgment greatly in excess of its market share and that
several liability would likely result in a less than full recovery for the
plaintiff.' The court's choice of several liability was in large measure
determined by "Sindell's goal of achieving a balance between the interests
of DES plaintiffs and manufacturers of the drug.' 8 2
A rule of several liability, however, has more to commend it than simply
being a good compromise between leaving plaintiffs remediless and sub-
jecting defendants to damages in excess of their share. Several liability is
more consistent with Sindell's stated goal of reproducing what would occur
if identification were possible in all cases. 3 Also, if market share liability
is to be championed as a doctrine imposing liability for risk creation, as
174. See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 40 Cal. 3d 672, 701-02, 710 P.2d 247, 267-
68, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447, 467-68 (1985) (Kaus, J., dissenting); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676
S.W.2d 241, 248 (Mo. 1984) (Gunn, J., dissenting); Robinson, supra note 89, at 726; Schwartz
& Mahshigian, supra note 133, at 657; Note, Industry-wide Liability and Market Share
Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423, 438-46 (1981); Note, supra note 168, at 673.
175. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 572, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189 (1982);
Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 601-02, 689 P.2d at 380-81; Wright, supra note 20, at 1819.
177. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 166, 342 N.W.2d at 37. Under Collins, the plaintiff may
proceed against a single defendant and to recover must show that the plaintiff's mother took
DES, that DES caused the plaintiff's subsequent injuries, that the defendant produced or
marketed the type of DES taken by the plaintiff's mother and that the defendant's conduct
in producing and marketing the DES constituted a breach of a legally recognized duty to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff and the defendant may bring in other defendants. Liability among
defendants is apportioned based upon a number of factors, including market share and degree
of fault. Id. at 194-200, 342 N.W.2d at 50-53.
178. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989) (following
Brown).
179. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 581, 689 P.2d at 368. Under Martin, defendants who can
establish their market share are only liable for that percentage of the plaintiff's losses. Any
defendants who cannot establish their market share are liable in equal shares for the balance
of the plaintiff's losses. Id. at 602-03, 689 P.2d at 382-83.
180. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
181. Id. at 1072-73, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
182. Id. at 1075, 751 P.2d at 487, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
183. See Note, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to DES Causation,
69 CAMU. L. Rnv. 1179, 1196 (1981).
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opposed to merely dividing a loss between plaintiffs and defendants,' 84 the
risk created by a particular drug company is not higher because not all
manufacturers can be joined in an action. Also, economic efficiency con-
siderations suggest that to force defendants to internalize losses properly
attributable to the production (market share) of other drug manufacturers
may result in overdeterrence of drug production. Finally, in breaking new
legal ground to devise a remedy benefiting plaintiffs it is important insti-
tutionally for a court to at least appear to be treating defendants fairly.'85
Another limitation on plaintiffs' ability to recover under a market share
theory not fully articulated in Sindell is the requirement that the plaintiff
join as defendants drug manufacturers whose market shares represent a
"substantial share" of the DES market. The court noted that a law review
note advocating a theory akin to market share liability suggested that 75-
80% of the DES market should be required but the court declined to
establish a specific percentage as a threshold.8 6
An opportunity to articulate the substantial share requirement more
specifically was presented in Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons.187 Murphy
was brought by Christine Murphy, an individual DES daughter, against a
single drug manufacturer, E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., on the theory that
Squibb produced the particular DES taken by her mother.' After the
Sindell decision was announced, Murphy attempted to broaden her action
against Squibb to include a market share theory and offered to prove that
Squibb had a ten percent share of the national market for DES. 89 The trial
court only allowed Murphy to proceed on her original theory and the jury
returned a special verdict finding that the DES purchased by Murphy's
mother was not manufactured by Squibb. 190 The court of appeal affirmed
on the theory that the special verdict established a market share theory
defense by satisfying Squibb's burden of proving that it did not manufacture
the injury-causing DES.' 9' The California Supreme Court also affirmed the
184. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 89, at 739-40 (Sindell court allocated loss in proportion
to the degree of risk created).
185. See infra text accompanying notes 306-09.
186. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The law review
note cited was Comment, supra note 136.
187. 40 Cal. 3d 672, 710 P.2d 247, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1985). The majority opinions in
Sindell, Murphy and Brown were all written by Justice Stanley Mosk.
188. Id. at 675, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449. Murphy was able to identify the
pharmacist from which her injury-causing DES was purchased and also named the pharmacy
as a defendant. The most controversial part of the Murphy decision was the majority's
conclusion that a pharmacy could not be held strictly liable for defective prescription drugs
sold by it.
189. Id. at 675, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
190. Id. at 675-76, 710 P.2d at 249, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
191. See Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 202 Cal. Rptr. 802, 811-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(opinion vacated). This reasoning is not sound. If the only evidence presented to the jury was
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trial court, 92 but on a different ground, holding that ten percent of the
DES market did not constitute a "substantial share."' 193 The court again
left open, however, the percentage of the market it would consider a
"substantial share.' ' 194
Of more fundamental concern is whether the "substantial share" require-
ment is valuable at all. The California Supreme Court's stated reason for
the substantial share requirement was "to diminish the injustice of shifting
the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate that they could not have
made the drug which caused the plaintiff's injuries."' 195 The court also
appears to have been trying to minimize the extent to which market share
liability departed from the alternative liability theory of Summers, which
the court interpreted as requiring all possible tortfeasors to be before the
court. 96 If defendants were jointly liable under a market share theory for
all of the plaintiff's damages, a substantial share requirement would serve
to reduce defendants' exposure to overpayment. 97 With several liability,
however, defendants are not exposed to overpayment. Moreover, the like-
lihood of any individual drug manufacturer being held liable for a portion
of a judgment when it in fact did not cause the plaintiff's injury is not
affected by the presence of other defendants. This has led some to argue
that the substantial share requirement is unnecessary. 9
The substantial share requirement is helpful, however, insofar as it serves
as a forced joinder rule and an election of legal theory rule. Forcing a
plaintiff to join a number of drug manufacturers in her market share suit
can promote fairness in several ways. With more manufacturers participating
Squibb's 10%0 market share the special verdict would be appropriate, but this should not
exonerate Squibb from paying 10% of a market share judgment, at least if manufacturers
representing a "substantial share" of the market are defendants. The court of appeal's rationale
would exonerate from a market share judgment all defendants with a market share determined
to be less than 50%.
192. See supra note 153.
193. Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 684, 710 P.2d at 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
194. See Note, Dealing Defective Drugs-Limiting Pharmacist and Manufacturer Liability:
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 173, 190-93 (1986). The author
concludes that "substantial share" requires joinder of defendants comprising over 50% of the
market. The author's reading of the language in Sindell and Murphy, however, is probably
too fine.
195. See Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1073, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 427 (citing Sindell,
26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132).
196. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
197. If, for example, the plaintiff can proceed with defendants representing only 25% of
the market present, those defendants may face liability for four times their share of the DES
market. If the plaintiff can only proceed with defendants representing 80% of the market
present, those defendants will only face liability for 1.25 times their share of the DES market.
198. See, e.g., Murphy, 40 Cal. 3d at 701-02, 710 P.2d at 267-68, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 467-68
(Kaus, J., dissenting) ("any particular defendant bears the same liability no matter how many
or how few other manufacturers are joined"); Robinson, supra note 89, at 725-26 (substantial
share requirement pointless).
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in the action, better data on market shares is likely to be available. 99 In
addition, multiple defendants can spread legal costs, at least as to common
issues.2 Plaintiffs also will not be able to force settlements on individual
defendants with a small market share who face slight liability but for whom
the cost of defending a suit would be burdensome, 20 ' which also may
decrease the number of suits filed. 20 2
The way the substantial share requirement acts as an election of legal
theory rule is illustrated by the facts of Murphy.2 3 For Murphy to have
proceeded on her traditional action against Squibb while at the same time
joining a number of manufacturers and proceeding on a market share theory
would have been awkward at best. By essentially forcing the plaintiff to
choose between a traditional action against a single drug company and a
market share suit, the substantial share requirement protects courts from
having to handle two trials at once, and to the extent plaintiffs choose to
proceed against a single manufacturer, the number of market share suits
would decrease. Although the substantial share requirement denies plaintiffs
like Murphy who try and fail to identify a particular manufacturer even a
partial recovery, this disadvantage is outweighed by administrative advan-
tages for the court.204
An even more important issue with market share liability is the relevant
definition of the market. The definition may (or may not) take into account
a variety of factors, including time periods, geographic areas, product
identifiability and marketing approaches. Manufacturers entered and left
the DES market throughout the twenty-four year period during which DES
was marketed as a miscarriage preventative, 20 5 so DES market shares differed
at different times. Also, national market shares differed from local market
shares and information on both is sketchy. 206 Neither national nor local
market shares necessarily correspond to the amount of DES sold by a
199. See Note, supra note 183, at 1197-98.
200. Given the nature of plaintiffs' allegations, standard of care and breach of duty questions
are likely to be common. Defendants' interests with respect to determining market shares are
adverse.
201. See Note, supra note 183, at 1198.
202. Plaintiffs would normally have an incentive to reduce their own legal costs by proceeding
against several manufacturers in a single action. If the strategy of forcing settlements from
individual defendants is pursued, however, plaintiffs may need to resort to actions against
individual manufacturers.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 187-94.
204. Administrative considerations are an important factor in the ability of courts to devise
new unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines. See infra text accompanying notes 310-13.
205. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 180, 342 N.W.2d at 44.
206. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 (acknowl-
edging practical problems in determining market share); Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 541
N.Y.S.2d at 949 ("[T]he reliable determination of any market smaller than the national one
likely is not practicable."); Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48 (determining not
to follow Sindell because of "practical difficulty of defining and proving market share").
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particular pharmacy.20 7 Although DES was manufactured using a standard
scientific formula, 28 pills differed, at least to some extent, in dosage, size,
shape and color. 209 Also, the marketing schemes employed by manufacturers
differed, some using brand names, others selling generically, 210 and with
variations in price21' and perhaps record keeping and distribution schemes. 21 2
One approach is to define market share narrowly, focusing on the
particular facts of the individual case at hand. Even if unable to identify a
manufacturer, plaintiffs should at least be able to identify the time and
place of pregnancy and may be able to provide some description of the
injury-causing product. Market share could be determined with respect to
the DES sold during a particular time period, in a particular pharmacy or
city and/or with particular physical characteristics. 21 3 The principal advan-
tage of this approach is that if market share is sensitive to the facts before
the court, it will most nearly approximate the probability that the defen-
dant's product caused the plaintiff's injury. In addition, a tightly focused
market share approach ties market share liability more closely to normal
tort rules in the event the plaintiff has some information identifying the
manufacturer.
An alternate approach is to define the market broadly without regard to
the details of a given plaintiff's situation. Defendants' "market shares" would
be constant from case to case notwithstanding the availability of particularized
information affecting the probabilities of causation in a given instance.214 Even
207. See, e.g., Mertan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 190 Cal. Rptr. 349, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (opinion ordered not published) (evidence indicated pharmacies carried DES manufactured
by some drug companies but not others).
208. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
209. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 382 (requiring that plaintiff prove that
"defendant produced or marketed the type (e.g., dosage, color, shape, markings, size, or other
identifiable characteristics) of DES taken by plaintiffs mother"); Murphy, 202 Cal. Rptr. at
810 (opinion vacated) (noting dispute in trial court over physical characteristics of DES pills
taken); Note, supra note 183, at 1192.
210. See McCreery, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 734 (Lilly and Rexall marketed
DES under nonproprietary name).
211. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 608, 689 P.2d at 384 (Squibb dismissed as defendant
because wholesale price of Squibb's trademark DES higher than retail price paid by plaintiff's
mother).
212. See Note, supra note 183, at 1192. Some DES was not marketed as a miscarriage
preventative but could have been used that way with a drug company's knowledge. See Miles
Laboratories v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1982) (drug
manufacturer not dismissed as defendant in market share suit).
213. See, e.g., George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 591-92, 733 P.2d 507, 511-12
(1987) (market shares should be determined based upon sales in local market (pharmacy,
pharmacies or city where DES purchased) but national market share data admissible if local
figures unavailable); Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 248 (Gunn, J., dissenting) (relevant market was
area of plaintiffs mother's residence, drugstore and pharmacist).
214. In Hymowitz, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the market share rule using a
national market. The court wished to avoid burdening parties with separate determinations in
each case and even refused to allow defendant drug companies an opportunity to escape
liability by showing that they did not cause a particular plaintiff's injury. 73 N.Y.2d at 511-
12, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
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if DES suits are not pursued as class actions, 21s mass-litigation techniques
such as those employed in Brown216 allow parties and courts to benefit from
economies of scale in fact-finding through the use of a single set of market
share determinations in a number of cases. Over a large run of cases
defendants' liability in the aggregate should work out properly. Also, market
share cases should have consistent outcomes.
21 7
With either approach "market share" can be refined to reflect not simply
gross product sold, but the likelihood of the defendant having manufactured
the injury-causing product in an unidentifiable tortfeaser case. 21 8 Such
refinement would attempt to account for variations in the identifiability or
harmfulness of defendants' products.219 Without such refinement, manufac-
turers with relatively identifiable products would face greater overall liability
in that they would be solely responsible for damages in conventional suits
in which they were identified without any reduction of their proportion of
market share judgments.2 Making such adjustments to "market shares,"
however, would likely present significant proof problems and would risk
adding another level of complication and arbitrariness to already difficult
adjudications.
In Sindell, the court defined the market broadly as the "entire production
of the drug sold by all [manufacturers] for [the] purpose [of preventing
miscarriage],"'21 but carved out an exclusion from liability for any defendant
which can prove that it did not manufacture the injury-causing pills in a
particular case.2 The wisdom of the Sindell approach depends upon the
215. Although class actions may be a desirable way to handle DES cases, noncommon issues
of fact have made class certification difficult to obtain. Compare Note, supra note 168, at
675 (advantages) with Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 382 (granting class certification for certain
purposes). Following remand, the trial court in Sindell denied certification of the plaintiff
class, citing "the lack of commonality among class members on issues of proximate cause,
extent of injury, and appropriate medical examination or treatment." See Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1120, 751 P.2d 923, 934, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 668-69 (1988).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
217. See generally Abraham, supra note 164, at 870-71 (mass tort cases more equitable if
similar cases treated alike).
218. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 867 ("when market share and risk contribution
diverge ... apportionment should accord with a firm's contribution to risk").
219. See, e.g., Case Comment, Refining Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories, 33 STAN. L. REv. 937, 944-46 (1981) (defining and advocating the use of "causation
shares"). Identifiability can vary among DES manufacturers in that a particular company may
have made physically distinct pills, marketed more heavily with a trade name orientation or
kept more thorough distribution records.
220. See Case Comment, supra note 219, at 946; Note, supra note 183, at 1192-93. Failure
to account for variations in identifiability and harmfulness provides an incentive for manu-
facturers to produce generic, untraceable products and to invest less in making products safer.
See Note, Market Share Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the
Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300, 316-21 (1981).
221. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
222. Id. at 602, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138; cf. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512,
541 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (defendant excused if did not participate in marketing of DES for
pregnancy use; if defendant did so participate, however, defendant not excused even if
defendant could not have caused particular plaintiff's injury).
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availability and quality of focused or direct evidence. The choice of market
share definition inevitably involves a trade off of administrability and
consistency versus precision in particular cases. If evidence to refine "market
shares" is difficult to obtain or of questionable accuracy, the pursuit of
precision may be little more than a costly exercise in arbitrariness. As a
first venture into a new area with no way for the court to grasp the full
evidentiary picture, 223 Sindell's broad approach is reasonable. The exclusion
for defendants who could not have been responsible, although of little use
to most manufacturers,2 at least minimizes the appearance of gross un-
fairness in particular cases.
A final issue presented by market share liability involves the cases in
which the plaintiff has some information pointing to a particular manufac-
turer. In Rogers v. Rexall Drug Co., decided with Sindell, the plaintiff
amended her complaint to allege that a particular defendant manufactured
the DES which injured her. The court suggested that, should she fail to
establish that fact, she could rely on a market share theory.2
Alternatives are available. For example, suits in which plaintiffs pursue
recovery against a particular manufacturer could be disallowed altogether.
This would eliminate the costly pursuit of particular evidence and would
avoid excess liability for defendants with identifiable products.2 On the
other hand, this approach would deny plaintiffs a remedy under traditional
tort theories and might force courts to unnecessarily incur the burdens of
handling market share liability cases.
A less drastic alternative would be to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to
pursue a market share recovery in cases where it does not seem necessary
or appropriate. 227 This would avoid the assertion that market share is a
reasonable approximation of the likelihood that a particular manufacturer
caused the plaintiff's injury in the face of a significant amount of specific
evidence, 228 but might place plaintiffs with no specific evidence in a relatively
better position, 229 perhaps discouraging the production of evidence. 210 As is
223. Sindell was decided on appeal from a demurrer.
224. See, e.g., Miles Laboratories, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (drug
manufacturer did not manufacture DES as a miscarriage preventative but not dismissed as a
defendant because DES made by manufacturer could have been so used with manufacturer's
knowledge).
225. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 597, 607 P.2d at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
226. See supra text accompanying note 220.
227. In Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court
declined to adopt market share liability in an asbestos context, pointing out that the plaintiff
was able specifically to identify at least eleven manufacturers supplying asbestos products to
which he was exposed and had a proper cause of action against such identified manufacturers.
Id. at 535-36.
228. See, e.g., Mertan, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (opinion ordered not published) (plaintiff
allowed to pursue market share theory despite presence of substantial specific evidence).
229. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
230. See infra text accompanying notes 277-86.
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the case in defining the relevant market, the best approach to these cases
may only be determinable as courts gain experience.
The particulars of market share liability remaining unsettled after Brown
are noteworthy but are perhaps inevitable with a new theory of liability.
Their resolution is not necessary to evaluate the position of market share
liability in the panoply of unidentifiable tortfeaser doctrines.
C. Market Share Liability in Perspective
An important aspect of market share liability which has received little
attention from commentators is what the Sindell court could have done but
did not do. Faced with the Sindell appeal and the set of facts pleaded, the
California Supreme Court could have chosen any of three different courses
of action: (1) affirm the trial court and deny recovery to the plaintiff, (2)
conclude that the facts pleaded by the plaintiff stated a cause of action
under recognized theories of liability for unidentifiable tortfeasor cases, or
(3) devise a new theory of liability (or make explicit modifications to an
existing theory) to provide the plaintiff a remedy.
In addition to the general factors counseling restraint in the creation of
new theories of liability, 231 in the DES context legislative or administrative
solutions have considerable appeal. 232 Yet administrative compensation sys-
tems are not without problems. 231 Moreover, the legislative process to
establish a compensatory scheme would by its nature be political, involving
the political power of manufacturers as well as the sympathetic or moral
appeal of victims. A premature closing of the courthouse doors would likely
disadvantage the DES plaintiffs in that manufacturers would have little
incentive to participate in a legislative solution if they no longer feared
judicial liability. The DES unidentifiable tortfeasor problem is a tort law
problem. Whether they endorse or deny a remedy, courts have an obligation
to address the issue.
Unlike other courts, 234 the Sindell court held that the facts alleged by the
plaintiff stated a cause of action. Before articulating its market share theory,
however, the court rejected the application of enhanced res ipsa loquitur as
231. See infra text accompanying notes 275-317.
232. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 621-22, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (policy decision to introduce and define market share liability
should rest with the legislature); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986)
(solution in legislative domain); Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 133, at 964-75 (proposing
legislative solution).
233. See Abraham, supra note 164, at 885-98; Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 926-28.
234. See, e.g., McCreery, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 730; Mulcahy, 386
N.W.2d at 67; Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 241.
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embodied in Haft,211 the concerted action theory of liability216 and the
enterprise liability variation thereof in Hall;23 7 and the alternative liability
theory. 23a The rejection of these unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines on the
pleaded facts was more than mere table-setting for market share liability.
The endorsement of any one of these theories in the DES context would
have expanded greatly its scope with significant consequence for future
application in other situations.
Sindell argued that Haft was analogous because the "defendants' failure
to discover or warn of the dangers of DES and to label the drug as
experimental caused her mother to fail to keep records or remember the
brand name of the drug prescribed to her. ' 2 9 The court concluded, however,
that the absence of evidence resulted "primarily from the passage of time
rather than from [the defendants'] acts of failing to provide adequate
warnings" and was not "due to the fault of defendants." 2  The court also
noted the "superior access to information" language in Ybarra and Summers
but commented that in Sindell neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were
in a better position to identify the manufacturer of DES ingested by the
plaintiff's mother.'
Following the Haft reasoning to find DES manufacturers liable would
have imposed significant record-keeping duties on drug manufacturers, 2
especially given the time element and indirect relationship between manu-
facturer and user.2 3 To hold manufacturers liable for failing to provide
labels that would have led to the availability of evidence is to overrun the
unidentifiable tortfeasor issue. The failure to label is at the heart of the
negligence issue, but does not provide a link between a particular manufac-
turer and a given plaintiff unless, under enhanced res ipsa loquitur notions,
one makes a defendant's negligence a sufficient reason to decide the iden-
tification issue against it as well. To hold negligent defendants automatically
liable in an unidentifiable tortfeasor case without regard to their degree of
cooperation, their relationship to the plaintiff or their present ability to
235. See supra text accompanying notes 70-87. Enhanced res ipsa loquitur on the basis of
a special relationship between drug manufacturer and user is not apposite. Indeed, Brown
suggests that a drug manufacturer's standard of care toward the user of its products may be
less than usual. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 118-27.
239. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 601 n.14, 607 P.2d at 930 n.14, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.14.
240. Id. at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Later in the opinion, however, the
court stated that the defendants' "conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed
for many years played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof." Id. at 611,
607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
241. See id. at 599-600, 607 P.2d at 928-29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
242. See Robinson, supra note 89, at 734-35; see also infra text accompanying notes 277-
86 (discussion of liability theories and incentives to preserve evidence).
243. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
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produce evidence would isolate a single aspect of Ybarra as sufficient to
impose liability. 2" This would significantly expand enhanced res ipsa loquitur
in the unidentifiable tortfeasor context.
Sindell's concert of action claim was based upon allegations of
"planned and concerted action, express and implied agreements, collab-
oration in, reliance upon, acquiescence in and ratification, exploitation
and adoption of each other's testing, marketing methods, lack of warn-
ings ... and other acts or omissions.. ." and that "acting individually
and in concert, [defendants] promoted, approved, authorized, acquiesced
in, and reaped profits from sales" of DES.-,
These allegations, Sindell claimed, "state a 'tacit understanding' among
defendants to commit a tortious act against her." 2" The court of appeal
concluded that Sindell's allegations suggested that each defendant "gave
substantial 'assistance or encouragement' to the tortious conduct of the
others" and that a concert of action cause of action could be maintained. 2A7
The California Supreme Court, however, looked more deeply into the
complaint and determined that "[tihe gravamen of the charge of concert
[was] that defendants failed to adequately test the drug or to give sufficient
warnings of its dangers and that they relied upon the tests performed by
one another and took advantage of each others' promotional and marketing
techniques . . . "24 which the court viewed as common parallel or imitative
conduct. u 9 The court reviewed Orser v. GeorgeO° and other cases and
characterized concert of action cases as involving a small number of defen-
dants, a single plaintiff, actions occurring over a short span of time and
direct participation by the defendant in the injury-causing act or encour-
agement or assistance of the person who directly caused the injury. 25 The
court also concluded that the genericness of the DES manufactured was
understandable in the prescription drug context. 252 Finally the court thought
244. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99. The particular aspect would be that of
"sanction for nonavailability of evidence."
245. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
246. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
247. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978),
rev'd, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
The Michigan Supreme Court, without significant elaboration, found the concert of action
theory applicable in the DES context in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d
164, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals allowed a DES
daughter to recover on a concert of action theory in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d
571, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982), because the defendant had failed to preserve the issue on appeal.
248. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
249. See id., 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
250. 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes
105-13.
251. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
252. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41. It has also been noted that
the concerted activities of the DES manufacturers-the pooling of information for the FDA
application-was not tortious. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 133, at 942 (citing
Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982)).
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it "dubious whether liability on the concert of action theory can be predi-
cated upon substantial assistance and encouragement given ... pursuant to
a tacit understanding to fail to perform an act."'-'-
The Sindell court correctly perceived that the application of the concert
of action theory to allow liability in that case would greatly extend the
reach of that doctrine. By limiting the concert of action theory, the court
prevented parallel conduct on the part of manufacturers from resulting in
joint and several liability for each without regard to whether it produced,
or demonstrably did not produce, the injury-causing product. 254
The Sindell court also rejected the "enterprise liability" variant on the
concerted action theory of Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.2 5 Sindell
argued that DES manufacturers followed an industry-wide safety standard
and pointed 'to a law review comment detailing an "enterprise liability"
approach to the DES causation problem.25 1 The court, however, distin-
guished Hall because, unlike the blasting cap industry, there were a large
number of DES manufacturers and no trade association had been delegated
functions related to product safety.257 Also, FDA regulation resulted in
product standards influenced to a considerable degree by the federal gov-
ernment.2 15 The court, in essence, took a narrow view of joint control of
risk. Although following industry standards should not establish due care
per se,519 neither should it establish liability without evidence of causation.
The most attractive of the existing unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines
before the Sindell court was the alternative liability theory of Summers v.
Tice.m Like Summers, Sindell can be characterized as a case involving an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants in which evidence identifying
the injury-causing defendant is unavailable through no fault of the plain-
tiff's. The court of appeal, drawing on Ybarra and Haft, had found the
alternative liability theory applicable.261
253. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Distinctions between
acting and failing to act are, however, subtle. The DES manufacturers' alleged concert of
action can be recharacterized as an agreement to take the act of marketing DES without
adequate testing. The shooters' concert of action in Orser can be recharacterized as an agreement
to fail to perform the act of ascertaining whether anyone was in the line of fire.
254. See id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141; see also Henderson, DES
Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 Cons. L. REv. 143, 146 (1979).
255. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); see supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
256. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 607 P.2d at 934-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43. The
Fordham Law Review comment combines elements of Hall and Summers in formulating its
"enterprise liability" theory. See Comment, supra note 136, at 995-1006. The rule proposed
is not dissimilar to the market share theory (e.g., the comment advocates the use of market
shares to apportion liability). What the comment advances, however, is not adoption of Hall
as much as a new theory of liability.
257. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
258. Id.
259, See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
260. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); see supra text accompanying notes 118-25.
261. See Sindell, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 147-50. The Michigan Supreme Court found the alternative
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The California Supreme Court, however, rejected alternative liability. In
so doing, the court focused on the fact that, of as many as 200 DES
manufacturers, only six were before the court. The court expressed concern
that there was therefore a "substantial likelihood" that none of the defen-
dants before the court had manufactured the DES which caused the plain-
tiff's injuries.2 2 This, however, did not prevent the court from creating
market share liability, although the "substantial share" requirement may
be seen as an attempt to address the concern. The court's concern with
alternative liability, therefore, appears to have been primarily with imposing
joint and several liability on all defendants without regard to the likelihood
that a particular defendant produced the injury-causing product. Summers
involved two defendants, both before the court, with each equally likely to
have caused the plaintiff's injury, so joint and several liability worked
well. 263 The absence of some manufacturers and the varying market shares
of those present, however, would make dividing liability equally among
those defendants before the court neither efficient nor fair.264
In addition, Summers' transfer of the burden of proof to the defendants
to absolve themselves is most reasonable when all who may have caused
the injury are before the court. 265 Consider, for example, the facts of Eley
v. Curzon.2 In Eley, a pedestrian on a highway in low visibility conditions
was hit by a car or truck. Three drivers who may have hit the plaintiff
were named as defendants. However, the plaintiff could have been struck
by yet a fourth driver, and without the presence of a party to speak to this
possible cause the defendants present would be left to absolve themselves
through speculation. 267 By declining in Sindell to apply unmodified the
alternative liability theory, the court contained the theory and prevented its
expansion to cases far afield of the Summers scenario.
Market share liability is in some respects a radical theory. Like alternative
liability, market share liability imposes liability for risk creation. 26 Market
liability theory, modified to include a requirement of an effort on the part of the plaintiff to
identify a particular defendant, applicable in Abel, 418 Mich. at 311, 343 N.W.2d at 164. In
Abel, all DES manufacturers who sold product in the relevant jurisdiction were believed to be
before the court.
262. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
263. See Kaye, Limits, supra note 145, at 510-11.
264. See Henderson, supra note 254, at 147.
265. The presumed liability of the defendants collectively to produce an explanation of the
plaintiff's injury was a significant factor in Ybarra. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
266. 121 Cal. App. 2d 280, 263 P.2d 86 (1953). The Eley court rejected the applicability of
Summers to the situation presented.
267. The nonpfrsence of defendants because of bankruptcy or settlement presents a difficult
case. See, e.g., Gard v. Raymark Indus., 185 Cal. App. 3d 583, 229 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (ordered not published) (approving application of alternative liability theory against
remaining manufacturers). Joint and several liability remains a-problem, but defendants who
have settled or are bankrupt are still identified and presumably available to testify.
268. See Robinson, supra note 89, at 749; Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 882-83; Wright,
supra note 20, at 1819; supra text accompanying note 140.
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share liability goes further, however, in at least one respect. In Summers
the defendants each breached a duty toward a particular plaintiff before
the court, but in Sindell defendants breached duties to indeterminate DES
daughters whose mothers used their products. Market share liability deals
with the identifiable tortfeasor issue in the aggregate, 269 replacing individual
responsibility with collective responsibility.
270
Viewed in perspective, however, market share liability is a narrow uni-
dentifiable tortfeasor doctrine tailored to a particular set of circumstances. 271
As presently articulated, the doctrine does not reach unidentifiable tortfeasor
cases involving nonfungible products, cases in which the plaintiff's injury
may not have been wrongfully caused or cases in which not all defendants
have acted tortiously. The nonfungibility problem has restricted the use of
market share liability in the asbestos context. 272 The non-wrongful cause
limitation appears to limit the doctrine's applicability in cases such as suits
against polluters who increase risks of disease. 273 Finally, the non-tortiously-
acting defendants limitation effectively precludes the use of market share
liability in manufacturing defect (as opposed to design defect) product
liability cases. 274
Perhaps Sindell's most significant breakthrough is its demonstration of a
court's willingness to devise new tort doctrines to deal with specific uniden-
tifiable tortfeasor situations. In the next Part of this Article I will suggest
certain factors courts should take into account in devising new unidentifiable
tortfeasor remedies. Measured by these criteria, market share liability ap-
pears to be a well-crafted approach to the DES causation problem.
269. See Wright, supra note 20, at 1819.
270. See Abraham, supra note 164, at 862; Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from
Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REv.
1473, 1484-85 (1986).
271. Cf. Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAtin. L. Rv. 881 (1982) (advocating expansion of market share liability to
apply to cases where victims are not identifiable).
272. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
("asbestos fibers are of several varieties, each used in varying quantities by the defendants in
their products, and each differing in harmful effects"); Mullen v. Armstrong Worldwide
Indus., 200 Cal. App. 3d 250, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1988); Gard, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 861; Celotex, 471 So. 2d at 538.
273. See Note, supra note 168, at 678-79; cf. Delgado, supra note 271, at 899-902 (advocating
expansion of market share liability to cover cases involving defendant's conduct increasing
incident of injury beyond level attributable to natural causes).
274. See Note, supra note 168, at 678. Market share liability was rejected in Sheffield v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983), where the plaintiff had
been injured by an improperly prepared polio vaccine and could not identify the particular
manufacturer. See also Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 972 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting market share liability where plaintiff "failed to allege that all of
the manufacturers [of multi-piece tire rim assemblies] have placed on the market fungible
products which share identical defective qualities").
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III. UNIDENTImABLE TORTFEASOR DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
In Part I of this Article I examined the development of unidentifiable
tortfeasor doctrines in a variety of contexts. In Part II, I examined the
market share theory of liability and noted that, although market share
liability marked a major breakthrough in the DES context, the theory was
carefully crafted for the particular unidentifiable tortfeasor problem pre-
sented and is more limited than would have been the endorsement of the
application of existing unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines.
In this Part, I will discuss several interrelated categories of issues courts
should consider in devising new unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines or ex-
panding existing doctrines. These categories can be loosely labeled evidence
production considerations, effectiveness considerations, the moral imperative
and institutional considerations. These will be considered in the light of two
unidentifiable tortfeasor settings: the DES situation and the situation pre-
sented by the well-known "blue bus" hypothetical. The DES situation has
been described earlier. 275 The "blue bus" hypothetical can be stated as
follows:
Mrs. Smith was driving on a public street and was forced off the
road by a negligently driven bus. She is able to testify that the bus was
blue, but is unable to describe the bus to any greater extent. Blue Bus
Co. owns and operates 80% of the blue buses operating in the town.
Mrs. Smith files a negligence action against Blue Bus Co. alleging the
foregoing. Does she recover?2 6
A. Evidence Production Considerations
The benefits for dispute resolution of having relatively full evidence before
the court are plain. 2n Fact-finding will be more accurate and judgments
perceived to be based upon complete information will likely be accorded
greater public acceptance. 27 The evidence production question, therefore, is
not whether additional evidence is beneficial but instead how far to pursue
its production.
The question has two separate aspects. The first concerns incentives to
produce available evidence in a given case. Evidence production can be
275. See supra text accompanying notes 132-45.
276. This simple version of the hypothetical follows Tribe, supra note 19, at 1340-41.
Alternate versions are detailed in Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 298-99 and Nesson, supra
note 22, at 1378-79. The hypothetical is based upon Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass.
469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945), one of the Sargent cases. See supra text accompanying notes 12-
27.
277. The value of different types of evidence (e.g., direct, circumstantial, statistical) is a
separate issue. See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
278. See Nesson, supra note 22, at 1379; Wright, supra note 20, at 1826.
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encouraged by placing the burden on the party expected to be able to
produce evidence to produce it or lose, even though evidence before the
court suggests that that party should win. 279 Ybarra. reflects this concern in
part.2
80
The other aspect concerns incentives to obtain or preserve evidence in a
particular category of cases. Assuming important evidence is not presently
available, the responsible party can be held accountable, thereby providing
incentives for labelling, record keeping and witnessing. 281 This was the main
thrust of the version of enhanced res ipsa loquitur propounded in Dierman
and Haft.282
In Sindell neither party could be expected to produce evidence as to
specific causation and the lack of evidence could not fairly be attributed to
the conduct of either the plaintiff or the defendants.383 In the blue bus case,
however, evidence suppression is an important issue. Under most circum-
stances a driver run off the road by a bus would be able to make a more
complete identification than simply that the bus was blue. Before providing
Mrs. Smith a remedy, the court must be comfortable with her explanation
of her inability to provide a better description. To award Mrs. Smith a
recovery would otherwise create a disincentive for her to provide evidence.
Evidence obtainment and preservation concerns are less salient but could
be relevant if Mrs. Smith did not keep her spectacles prescription current
or if Blue Bus Co.'s practices made its buses difficult to identify. 28
The pursuit of evidence can, of course, be taken too far28s and courts
must be careful to avoid making, to quote Prosser, "sheer ignorance ...
the most powerful weapon in law. ' 286 Nevertheless, before fashioning or
extending unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines courts must be sensitive to the
effects of such doctrines on incentives to produce, obtain and preserve
relevant evidence.
279. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1361. Incentives to produce evidence may be directed at
defendants as well as plaintiffs. See Brook, Inevitable Errors, supra note 18, at 101.
280. See supra text accompanying note 95.
281. See Robinson, supra note 89, at 733-34.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 70-89.
283. See supra text accompanying note 144.
284. In Kaminsky v. Hertz, 94 Mich. App. 356, 288 N.W.2d 426 (1979), a defendant's
course of conduct made the operators of vehicles with its logo difficult to determine. The
plaintiff was injured by ice which fell from a truck identified only as having Hertz colors and
logo. Hertz owned 90% but not all of such vehicles. In ruling that the plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the ownership question, the court relied in part upon
a belief that "any business organization which permits a commercial conveyance to operate
on the public highways prominently proclaiming its name owes a duty to the public to stand
by that voluntary, self-advertising proclamation." Id. at 359, 288 N.W.2d at 427.
285. Dierman and, perhaps, Ybarra are examples of this. See supra text accompanying notes
76-81 and notes 95-99.




Effectiveness considerations involve the effectiveness of an unidentifiable
tortfeasor doctrine in achieving the optimum distribution of loss between
plaintiffs and defendants and among defendants. An effective remedy avoids
overdeterrence and underdeterrence and leaves each party in a fair posi-
tion.27 Effectiveness concerns are most significant with unidentifiable tort-
feasor doctrines employing probabilistic or statistical evidence. One' aspect
of the problem concerns the efficiency of a remedy in a particular case or
category of cases and another concerns the flexibility of the jurisdiction's
tort system.
Before devising or employing an unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrine based
upon probabilistic or statistical evidence, courts must first consider the
probative value of such evidence. If much specific evidence relating to the
factual determinations to be made is before the court, probabilistic or
statistical evidence may be of very little help.28 If specific evidence is not
available, courts must, before employing probabilistic or statistical evidence,
ascertain the closeness of the relationship between the measure employed
and the determination sought. The value of background statistics can vary
significantly. 289
In the DES context, although market shares are difficult to determine
and the market share theory does not account for possible differences in
the harmfulness of DES produced, 290 the amount of DES produced by each
drug manufacturer is a reasonable approximation of the amount of harm
caused.
A close relationship between market shares and harm caused often does
not exist, however, in many other cases which appear similar. Some prod-
ucts, like asbestos, 29' appear in a variety of forms with varying toxicities.
Some products, like cigarettes, 292 increase the risk of certain types of diseases
287. One element of fairness is imposing liability on defendants commensurate with the
harm they caused. Another element is imposing liability only on defendants who have
demonstrably breached the applicable standard of care. See infra text accompanying notes 297-
304.
288. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 305; see also Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,
406 F.2d 1315 (3d Cir. 1969) (significant specific evidence; probability-based remedy rejected);
Mertan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 141 Cal. App. 3d 511, 190 Cal. Rptr. 349 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (opinion ordered not published) (significant specific evidence; plaintiff nevertheless
permitted to pursue market share theory).
289. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 343.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 205-12.
291. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
292. See Abraham, supra note 164, at 865 ("nothing even remotely as precise a proxy for
the probability of responsibility as market share is available in most nonsignature disease
cases"); Note, supra note 168, at 678 n.54 ("Cigarette smoking increases the incidence of
heart disease and lung cancer, but cannot be isolated from other factors and established as
the but-for cause of a particular individual's disease.").
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without being the sole cause. Also, differences in marketing methods and
the presence or absence of warnings and safety instructions may make
equally dangerous products differ in their likelihood of causing injury.29 In
such cases "market shares" alone are not sufficient, and reasonable cau-
sation probabilities can only be determined with difficulty and a fair degree
of speculation.
In the blue bus case, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that
Blue Bus Co. owns and operates 80% of the blue buses operating in the
town that there is an 80% likelihood that Blue Bus Co. caused Mrs. Smith's
accident. Probabilities would differ if Blue Bus Co.'s drivers drove negli-
gently more (or less) often than drivers of other companies294 and could
change dramatically if the accident occurred on a regular route of Blue Bus
Co. (or another bus company) or if the accident occurred near (or away
from) Blue Bus Co.'s yard.
A more general consideration in devising probability-based unidentifiable
tortfeasor doctrines is whether the jurisdiction's tort rules are sufficiently
flexible to apportion liability fairly. With market share liability, as amplified
by Brown, DES manufacturers are liable only severally and in a proportion
not in excess of their market shares. 295 If the plaintiff cannot be limited to
less than a full recovery or if the defendants' liability must be joint and
several, however, solvent defendants before the court may be subject to
greater than "efficient" liability. In the blue bus case, for example, Blue
Bus Co. may face liability for all accidents involving unidentified blue
buses. 296
C. The Moral Imperative
The moral imperative supports applying an unidentifiable tortfeasor doc-
trine when it can be shown independently of the specific causation issue
that the defendants each breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff or
similarly situated persons. In the DES situation presented in Sindell, all
defendants were assumed to have been negligent and a cornerstone of the
court's decision was the rationale of Summers v. Tice that "as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost
of the injury." 297 Even if, as the Sindell dissent pointed out,29 it is more
293. See Note, supra note 168, at 679 n.58.
294. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 346-47 (percentage of buses not same as percentage
of negligently driven buses).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 171-82.
296. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 1349-50. This is not to say, however, that it is necessarily
more "efficient" or fair in such a situation to leave a plaintiff remediless. See Brook, Inevitable
Errors, supra note 18, at 101-02.
297. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 154-59.




likely than not that a given defendant did not cause the injury of the
particular plaintiff, each DES manufacturer did increase the risk of injury
to the plaintiff and other DES daughters collectively and it is likely that
each defendant's wrongful conduct was responsible for harm to someone.
299
When, in an unidentifiable tortfeasor situation, causation and negligence
are linked, however, uncertainty about identity is also uncertainty about
negligence. In the blue bus case, for example, if Blue Bus Co. did not force
Mrs. Smith's car off the road, Blue Bus Co. did not act negligently toward
anyone. If we believe there is an 80% chance Blue Bus Co. caused Mrs.
Smith's accident and Mrs. Smith is allowed to prevail, there is an 80%
chance of having correctly held liable a tortfeasor. If, however, ten separate
bus companies each operate 10% of the blue buses operating in the town,
to award a remedy would impose liability on ten defendants each of which
was substantially less likely than not negligent and nine of which were in
fact innocent. The moral imperative for providing a remedy in such a case
is at best weak and the message delivered by the court is more "don't
operate buses" than "don't act wrongfully. ' 300
Unidentifiable tortfeasor cases involving manufacturing defects are simi-
lar.301 In Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.,30 2 for example, the plaintiff had been
permanently disabled by an injection of defective Salk polio vaccine, the
manufacturer of which could no longer be identified. A critical difference
from Sindell was that all defendants in Sindell manufactured a defective
generic product, while in Sheffield, although all defendants manufactured
a generic product, only one manufactured a defective one and market share
liability was rejected. 03 Courts must be wary, therefore, of employing
unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines in cases involving isolated injuries or
other situations in which an independent showing cannot be made on the
standard of care issue.3 4
299. Sindell is in this sense more compelling than Summers. Sindell can be viewed as a
decision to deal with the DES problem in the aggregate without concern over matching
individual DES daughters with particular manufacturers. But cf. Schwartz & Mahshigian,
supra note 133, at 948 (essential to show defendant breached duty to individual plaintiff).
300. See Nesson, supra note 22, at 1383.
301. Professor Rosenberg argues that proportionality rules like market share liability should
be applicable to intermittent torts, taking into account long-run accident or defect rates. See
Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 868. If a given industry produces a large number of similar
defective products of untraceable source, the DES scenario may invite comparison. Even in
such event, however, evidentiary problems in determining defective product track-records would
likely be insurmountable.
302. 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983).
303. Id. at 592-99, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 875-80; see also Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal.
App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978) (plaintiff injured by defective fencing blade made by
one of two manufacturers).
304. In special situations the moral imperative may suggest protecting to a greater extent a
particular party from the risk of error. Protection of defendants in criminal prosecutions is
one example. See Ball, supra note 19, at 816; Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 309; cf. supra
text accompanying notes 49-69 (enhanced res ipsa loquitur applied when special relationship




Before devising new unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines or employing
existing doctrines in new situations, courts must consider issues relating to
the role and operations of the judicial system. A readily apparent issue
concerns the role of the courts in addressing the existing harm. Legislative
solutions are not always feasible and the denial or grant of a tort remedy
may affect the legislative process.3 05 Nevertheless, many situations are better
left in the legislative domain and/or are best addressed by providing
administrative remedies.
A more subtle factor involves the public acceptance of judgments. A goal
of the judicial process is to articulate statements about past events that can
be accepted as true for purposes of entering a judgment and spelling out
the rights of the parties thereafter.3°0 A problem for the acceptability of
unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines based primarily on statistical evidence is
that uncertainty is acknowledged and the public is aware that the trier of
fact cannot do better than make a probabilistic statement, a "bet." 307
Against this, of course, must be balanced public acceptance difficulties in
withholding a remedy from deserving plaintiffs0 and the value to the
judicial system of being seen as attempting to reach probable results, thereby
reducing the number of "errors." 3 °9 There are a large number of DES cases
and liability may be viewed as working out in the aggregate. Acceptability
is a significant concern, however, in isolated incident cases.
A third institutional consideration is the wise allocation of judicial re-
sources. Ideally, no proper remedy should be denied because of inadequate
resources. Realistically, courts have limited resources which they should
allocate in a manner maximizing the judicial system's productivity.310 Even
assuming accurate results are obtainable, 3" overcoming formidable proof
problems may be difficult and resource consuming. The DES situation
involves a large number of cases and a great deal of harm. 31 2 Providing a
remedy for isolated incidents like the blue bus case, however, may not be
worthwhile. To ensure that limited judicial resources are well spent, before
devising or employing new unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines courts must
balance the magnitude of the problem presented, in terms of the number
of like cases and the severity of harm caused, against administrative burdens
and proof problems.
.305. See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
306. See Ball, supra note 19, at 808; Nesson, supra note 22, at 1358-59.
307. See Nesson, supra note 22, at 1378-79.
308. See Brook, Use, supra note 23, at 335-36.
309. See Brook, Inevitable Errors, supra note 18, at 105.
310. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 888.
311. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 287-96 (effectiveness of remedies varies).
312. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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The practical realities of litigation also burden the parties so courts should
evaluate the magnitude of the harm and the problem of proof from the
litigants' perspective. Granting a remedy while placing a virtually insur-
mountable burden of proof upon the plaintiff does not accomplish much.
Conversely, placing heavy or impossible proof burdens on defendants may
make suits difficult to defend from a practical standpoint and amount to
an imposition of liability. A situation of particular concern would be one
in which a plaintiff could maintain an action against a number of defendants
with bare allegations or only a minimal factual showing. In such a case it
may be cost-effective for a plaintiff to bring suit but not cost-effective to
present even a meritorious defense, especially if a defendant's share of the
total liability is minor. Thus, the plaintiff may be able to readily obtain
settlements without the need to have, or to establish, a case 3
Finally, courts must consider the possibility that a new unidentifiable
tortfeasor doctrine will be misapplied in subsequent cases. Unidentifiable
tortfeasor doctrines are fact specific and the danger of error is great. Courts
can misapprehend key factual elements of a case,314 apply liability theories
without recognizing the absence of essential elements315 and misunderstand
the purpose of doctrinal components. 316 Also, with respect to unidentifiable
tortfeasor remedies relying on probability determinations, courts must re-
member that mathematical "proofs" are often replete with inadequacies,
both in terms of mathematical error and nonsubstantiation of data.317
CONCLUSION
Unidentifiable tortfeasor cases present difficult problems of uncertainty.
Courts must deal not only with uncertainty about the commission of a tort
313. See Note, supra note 220, at 324 (viewing the market share theory as an example of
such a case). This is not to say that cases should not settle nor to deny that nearly every case,
no matter how frail, has some "nuisance value" in settlement. The difference is that the sum
of the "nuisance values" to a large number of defendants may be considerable in relation to
the intrinsic value of the plaintiff's claim.
314. See, e.g., Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951) (discussed supra note
38); Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 72-81).
315. See, e.g., Litzmann v. Humboldt County, 273 P.2d 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954)
(discussed supra note 127).
316. See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 202 Cal. Rptr. 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(opinion vacated) (discussed supra note 191 and accompanying text); Kilgore v. Shepard Co.,
52 R.I. 151, 158 A. 720 (1932) (discussed supra note 35).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor confused
the probability of matching hair samples with the probability of mistaken identity); Miller v.
State, 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966) (no foundation on which to base probabilities);
People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (no substantiation
of probabilities, misapplication of product rule, confusion of probability of occurrence with
probability of mistaken identity); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966) (probability




but uncertainty concerning the identity of the tortfeasor. While the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur provides a means to deal with uncertainty, overcoming
the tendencies exhibited in the Sargent line of cases, it does not, as a
circumstantial evidence rule, address the unidentifiable tortfeasor situation.
From res ipsa loquitur and the separate notion of certain defendants
having "superior access to information," California courts developed the
doctrine I have referred to as enhanced res ipsa loquitur. Enhanced res ipsa
loquitur deals with uncertainty by shifting the burden of proof (and loss,
if proof is not available) to defendants standing in a special relationship to
plaintiffs or who can be characterized as responsible for the uncertainty.
As evidenced by Ybarra, when these factors are present, enhanced res ipsa
loquitur can be used with major impact in unidentifiable tortfeasor cases.
The concert of action theory and alternative liability theory are express
unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines. Although these doctrines appear in sim-
ilar factual situations involving complementary action by two or more
defendants, their theoretical underpinnings are quite different. Both are
limited, however, in that the concert of action theory requires an agreement
and the alternative liability theory requires a limited number of potential
tortfeasors, all of whom are before the court.
The DES situation presents the unindentifiable tortfeasor problem dra-
matically. The California Supreme Court responded in Sindell by fashioning
a new unindentifiable tortfeasor doctrine-market share liability. Although
properly hailed as a breakthrough, market share liability was actually less
of a departure from current norms than would have been stretching existing
unidentifiable tortfeasor doctrines to apply to the DES situation.
Although important aspects of the doctrine are still unsettled, market
share liability appears to be generally well-suited to the DES situation: A
large amount of harm needs to be redressed, there is, at least at the pleading
stage, the moral imperative presented by innocent plaintiffs and negligent
defendants, the use of market shares and several liability makes for an
effective remedy and evidence production worries are relatively mild. With
the hypothetical blue bus case the reasons for providing a remedy are less
compelling. There are significant concerns about evidence suppression, ef-
fectiveness and the magnitude of institutional burdens relative to the amount
of harm to be redressed.
Although courts have erred and misapplied doctrines, California courts
have generally done a good job handling unidentifiable tortfeasor situations.
Their and other courts' ability to continue to do so in the future will hinge
upon their sensitivity to issues presented by unidentifiable tortfeasor situa-
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